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THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND ALGORITHMIC TOOLS IN 
THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND* 
 
A growing portion of the American public—including policymakers, 
advocates, and institutional stakeholders—have accepted the fact that racism 
endemic to the United States infects every stage of the criminal legal system.  
Acceptance of this fact has resulted in efforts to address and remedy 
pervasive and readily observable systemic bias.  Chief among those efforts is 
a turn toward technology—specifically algorithmic decision-making and 
actuarial tools.  Many have welcomed the embrace of technology, confident 
that technological tools can solve a problem—race-based inequity—that has 
bedeviled humans for generations.  This Article engages that embrace by 
probing the adoption of technological tools at various sites throughout the 
criminal legal system and exploring their efficacy as a remedy to racial 
inequality.  Then, by applying a racial justice lens, this Article develops and 
offers a set of prescriptions designed to address the design, implementation, 
and oversight of algorithmic tools in spaces where the promise offered by 
technological tools has not been met.  Adherence to that lens may draw us 
closer to what this Article terms a pragmatic abolitionist ethos regarding the 
use of technological tools in the criminal legal system.  Such an ethos does 
not mean the immediate absence of a criminal legal system altogether.  It 
instead means a criminal system that ultimately operates in ways 
dramatically different from the current regime by divesting from 
incarceration and investing in community well-being, human welfare, and 
rehabilitation.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Bubbling crack, jewel theft and robbery to combat poverty 
And end up in the global jail economy 
Stiffer stipulations attached to each sentence 
Budget cutbacks but increased police presence 
And even if you get out of prison still living 
Join the other five million under state supervision 
This is business: no faces, just lines and statistics 
From your phone, your Zip Code to SSI digits 
The system break man, child, and women into figures 
Two columns for “who is” and “who ain’t [n***** ]” 
Numbers is hard and real and they never have feelings 
But you push too hard, even numbers got limits 
– Mos Def1 
 
 
[T]he great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it 
within us, are unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and 
history is literally present in all that we do. 
– James Baldwin2 
 
* * * 
 
No matter where one stands on matters of law and order, the problems 
that characterize America’s criminal legal system are well-documented.  It is 
rife with inequity and plagued by unfairness.  More often than not, criminal 
legal system outcomes turn on the characteristics, identity, and economic 
status of those targeted by the system and the actors responsible for its 
operation.  It is overly punitive, generally devoid of empathy, and, in large 
part, fails to ensure public safety, individual accountability, or the health of 
communities.3  
 
 1. MOS DEF, Mathematics, on BLACK ON BOTH SIDES (Rawkus Records 1999). 
 2. James Baldwin, The White Man’s Guilt, EBONY, Aug. 1965, at 47 (emphasis omitted).  
 3. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); RACHEL BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING 
THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 
(2018); DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD 
TO REPAIR (2019); see also Mark Osler, Short of the Mountaintop: Race Neutrality, Criminal Law, 
and the Jericho Road Ahead, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 77, 87–90 (2018) (describing racial inequality 
that permeates each stage of the criminal legal system); Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming 
Evidence the Criminal-Justice System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST, (June 10, 2020) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-
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Critiques of the criminal legal system that are rooted in race and racism 
have exposed it as a mechanism of social control, designed from birth to 
perpetuate an oppressive regime of racial caste and fueled by an irrational 
fear of people of color.4  History has witnessed the system evolve over time—
in part through intentional design, in part through benign neglect, and in part 
through policies that ignore structural inequality to exacerbate harm—to 
consume communities of color and relegate its subjects to second-class 
citizenship.5  These critiques have laid bare the deeply problematic decision-
making that characterizes the criminal system.  
In recent years, those concerned about the failings of the system, 
including policymakers, data scientists, technologists, and system actors have 
turned to technology as a means of curing its ills.6  They have done so with 
good intentions.  Many want to eliminate racism in the system and implement 
policies in service of that goal, such as shrinking the prison and jail 
populations, ending money bail, and holding system actors to account for 
bias.7  Data-driven, fact-based, technological interventions that inform the 
decision-making of system actors are thought of as the solution.  
 
criminal-justice-system/ (detailing a myriad of studies demonstrating racial inequity in the criminal 
legal system).  
 4. Bryan Stevenson, Slavery Gave America a Fear of Black People and a Taste for 
Punishment. Both Still Define our Criminal-Justice System, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/prison-industrial-complex-slavery-
racism.html; see also Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 
3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 97 (2001) (viewing the criminal legal system, and the “penal system 
as an instrument for the management of dispossessed and dishonored groups,” such that “the 
astounding upsurge in black incarceration in the past three decades as a result of the obsolescence 
of the ghetto as a device for caste control and the correlative need for a substitute apparatus for 
keeping (unskilled) African Americans . . . in a subordinate and confined position in physical, 
social, and symbolic space”); see also PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 5 
(2017) (observing that “the system is broke on purpose”). 
 5. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 811, 816–20 (2017); see also supra note 4.  
 6. The hope that technology might resolve America’s racial ills is longstanding.  As early as 
1967, civil rights leader Roy Wilkins asked whether the computer could “turn its impersonal, 
unprejudiced magic upon our agonizing race problem?  Could it not, after digesting the facts which 
whites and blacks have fogged over for so long give us an outline of our obligation?  [C]an [] not 
the computer become a guidepost to interracial justice and peace?”  CHARLTON MCILWAIN, BLACK 
SOFTWARE 243 (2020). 
 7. See Sam Corbett-Davies, Sharad Goel, & Sandra González-Bailón, Even Imperfect 
Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithms-bail-criminal-justice-system.html 
(extolling the potential value of technology to address inequity, bias, racism and other harmful facets 
of the criminal legal system); Stephanie Wykstra, Philosopher’s Corner: What is “Fair”? 
Algorithms in Criminal Justice, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 34, no. 3 (Spring 2018), 
https://issues.org/perspective-philosophers-corner-what-is-fair-algorithms-in-criminal-justice/ 
(same); Alex P. Miller, Want Less-Biased Decisions? Use Algorithms., HARV. BUS. REV. (July, 26, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms (same). 
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Unfortunately, as presently envisioned and executed, the turn to 
technological tools is destined to fall short of its lofty and admirable aims.  
This Article suggests that to transform the criminal legal system, advocates 
need to adopt a lens centered on racial justice to inform technology-based 
efforts rather than simply layering tools onto it in its current state.  Doing so 
would mean that rather than attempting to solve or eradicate racism, we 
would account for the role that racism plays as we design, implement, and 
engage in oversight of these technological tools.  This Article applies a racial 
justice-focused theoretical framework grounded in critical race theory to 
confront and address the pressing problems presented by the use of 
technological tools in the criminal legal system.  Ultimately, this framework 
suggests that we deploy such tools in a way that represents a paradigmatic 
shift in the way our current criminal system operates.   
The problem technology purports to solve is not new.8  Decision-making 
in the criminal legal system depends on assessments by human beings at 
every critical stage of the criminal process, from arrest and prosecution to 
punishment and reintegration.  The decisions that people make about other 
people—and the social and cultural baggage attached to those decisions—are 
among the clearest sources of systemic inequity.  While some attempt to turn 
a blind eye to this reality, the quantitative data and qualitative experience 
make clear that the discretion of criminal legal system actors is infused with 
bias.9  
It is within that context, and with a growing acknowledgment of these 
truths, that efforts to reform the criminal legal system have been undertaken.  
 
 8. Before algorithmic tools emerged, assessments of risk were based largely on individual 
judgements—gut instinct informed by experience.  Sarah L. Desmarais & Evan M. Lowder, Pretrial 
Risk Assessment Tools: A Primer for Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys, SAFETY AND 
JUST. CHALLENGE 1, 5 (2019), http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Primer-February-2019.pdf.  Bias was the norm, 
decision-making was wildly inconsistent, and disparities emerged and grew.  Id.  The last decade or 
so has brought with it the development and use of actuarial tools to help judges and other actors 
forecast outcomes and make better decisions.  Id.  
 9. Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Crack as Proxy: Aggressive Federal Drug Prosecutions and 
the Production of Black—White Racial Inequality, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 773, 799–803 (2018) 
(concluding that prosecutorial discretion was a significant driver of racial disparities in the sentences 
received for crack related offenses); Osler, supra note 3, at 79, 92 (describing “the swamp where 
[racial] inequality breeds: the hidden world of discretion” and noting that 
“[t]he criminal justice system as a whole abounds with unobserved discretion that masks the 
influence of racial bias”); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias 
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 805–22 (2012) (describing 
the “broad and deep” nature, and potential impact of, implicit racial bias on prosecutorial discretion, 
and the racially skewed system the exercise of that discretion produces); L. Song Richardson, 
Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 887 (2017) 
(“[T]he enormous discretion wielded by prosecutors, defense lawyers, 
and judges facilitates racial bias, both conscious and implicit.”). 
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Previous waves of reform have looked to shape or somehow improve 
decision-making by systemic actors to eradicate the implicit and explicit bias 
that fosters injustice.10  The introduction of artificial intelligence, predictive 
analytics, automated decision-making, actuarial risk assessment instruments, 
and machine learning—collectively known in this Article under the general 
umbrella of algorithmic tools—into the criminal legal field is, in some ways, 
just the latest attempt to improve decision-making and counter the frailties of 
human judgment.11  
Proponents of algorithmic tools market them to criminal legal system 
reformers and stakeholders as a novel approach with greater potential than 
 
 10. The federal sentencing guidelines are one example of this kind of change that ultimately 
failed to yield the fairness reformers hoped they would.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing 
Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1609, 1619 (2012) 
(describing the adoption of the sentencing guidelines as “a story about the desire for racial justice.  
Unfortunately, even a cursory look at criminal justice in the United States—in states with or without 
guidelines—demonstrates that questions of racial justice have hardly been answered.”).  The 
guidelines were intended to weed out disparities and curtail wild inconsistencies in judgments about 
individuals, while providing common factors that judges could use to consider and determine risk.  
Id. at 1619–22.  They were successful to a point, because they did, at times, narrow the previously 
wide divergences in assessments and imposed greater uniformity in outcomes.  Id.  But those gains 
in efficiency were outweighed by the loss of a system that imposed individualized justice for those 
who came before the court.  Id. 
 11. An algorithm is an unambiguous set of steps undertaken to solve a problem.  Algorithm, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020); Jacob Brogan, What’s the Deal With 
Algorithms?, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:29 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/whats-the-
deal-with-algorithms.html.  A helpful and straightforward definition of algorithmic tools are those 
which apply “an automated protocol to a large volume of data to classify new subjects in terms of 
the probability of expected criminal activity and in relation to the application of state coercion.”  
Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1060 (2019).  This 
definition consists of an algorithm, or an automated protocol, to “routinize[ ] a decision” about state 
intrusion into one’s life.  Id.  The sheer volume of data examined requires the use of an algorithm 
and advanced computing resources.  Id.  The tools are also forward looking, in that they make 
predictions about future behavior or occurrences, rather than identifying historical instances of 
criminal activity.  Id.  In this context, an algorithm is “any well-defined computational procedure 
that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.” 
Gabriel Nicholas, Explaining Algorithmic Decisions, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 711, 714 (2020) 
(emphasis on original) (quoting THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 
(3rd ed. 2009)).  An algorithm can refer to rules that produce a deductive output, or “to inductive 
procedures that come up with their own rules by generalizing from examples.  Algorithms that use 
the latter option are called machine learning algorithms.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Machine 
learning uses an algorithm to create an algorithm.  Id.  Specifically, it uses one algorithm, a learner, 
to read data as a set of numerical features, infer rules about those features to predict a particular 
outcome, and then produce a model that embodies those rules.  Id.  I am using the term algorithmic 
tools to generally refer to a range of processes and tools, but recognize that there are differences in 
the methods, techniques, and development of each type of tool.  See Vincent M. Southerland & 
Andrea Woods, What Does Fairness Look Like? Conversations on Race, Risk Assessment Tools, 
and Pretrial Justice, CTR. ON RACE, INEQUALITY, AND THE L. AT N.Y.U. LAW & AM. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION, 1, 5–6 (Oct. 2018) (highlighting definitional differences).  
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all past reform mechanisms.12  This is not surprising given the great promise 
that these technologies purport to hold.  They have been deployed in an 
attempt to forecast where crimes may take place,13 to identify potential 
perpetrators and crime victims,14 to predict one’s risk of re-arrest or 
appearance in court,15 to determine an appropriate sentence,16 and to suggest 
when one should be released from incarceration.17  Proponents of the tools 
and stakeholders who have embraced them have heralded them as race 
neutral, countering one of the most persistent and pernicious concerns with 
the criminal legal system.18  And they have been posited as improving 
outcomes for all.19  
 
 12. Sam Corbett-Davies, supra note 7; Anne Milgram, Why Smart Statistics are the Key to 
Fighting Crime, TED (Oct. 2013) (transcript available at 
https://www.ted.com/talks/anne_milgram_why_smart_statistics_are_the_key_to_fighting_crime/tr
anscript); Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 22, 
2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/22/in-defense-of-risk-assessment-
tools;, Bail Reform, ARNOLD VENTURES,  https://www.arnoldventures.org/work/release-decision-
making/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).  In part, this turn to technology exemplifies what software 
developer and data journalist Meredith Broussard has called “technochauvinism,” which is “the 
belief that tech always the solution.”  MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW 
COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD 9 (2018).  
 13. Randy Rieland, Artificial Intelligence is Now Used to Predict Crime. But Is It Biased?, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/artificial-
intelligence-is-now-used-predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/. 
 14. Jeff Asher & Rob Arthur, Inside the Algorithm That Tries to Predict Gun Violence in 
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/upshot/what-an-
algorithm-reveals-about-life-on-chicagos-high-risk-list.html. 
 15. See generally Robert Werth, Risk and Punishment: The Recent History and Uncertain 
Future of Actuarial, Algroithmic, and “Evidence-based” Penal Techniques, 13 SOCIO. COMPASS 
126 (2019). 
 16. Sara Chodosh, Courts Use Algorithms to Help Determine Sentencing, but Random People 
Get the Same Results, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/recidivism-
algorithm-random-bias/. 
 17. Amy McCaig, Algorithms For Parole Can Have Serious Bias Problems, FUTURITY (Apr. 
9, 2019), https://www.futurity.org/risk-assessment-tools-prison-2031222/. 
 18. See, e.g., Alex Chohlas-Wood & E. S. Levine, A Recommendation Engine to Aid in 
Identifying Crime Patterns, 49 INFORMS J. ON APPLIED ANALYTICS 154 (2019); 
Predictive Policing: Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, PREDPOL, 
https://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works/ (last visited May 7, 2021) (“PredPol uses 
ONLY 3 data points—crime type, crime location, and crime date/time – to create its predictions.  
No personally identifiable information is ever used.  No demographic, ethnic or socio-economic 
information is ever used.  This eliminates the possibility for privacy or civil rights violations seen 
with other intelligence-led policing models.”).  
 19. Are We at the Tipping Point in Police-Community Relations?, PREDPOL (Jun 11, 2020, 
12:02 PM), https://blog.predpol.com/are-we-at-a-tipping-point-in-police-community-relations 
(purporting that “objective, agreed-upon facts” arising out of data-driven policing can be used to 
provide transparency in decision making, auditability, and room for discussion around race and 
policing).  
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The reality falls far short of the promise.  These tools, as designed and 
deployed in the current legal framework, fail to correct or upend the racial 
inequity that pervades the criminal legal system.  Algorithmic tools aimed at 
forecasting the behavior of those who are ensnared by the carceral state 
ensure that all reform efforts will focus on changing the behavior of those 
being consumed by the system rather than the operation of the system.  By 
choosing to target those who are accused and captured, algorithmic tools 
presuppose that the people going through the system must be fixed or 
corrected in some way, rather than altering the system itself.  They foster 
retail reforms where wholesale change is needed.  To make matters worse, 
the prevailing legal regime for rooting out racial bias in criminal legal system 
decision making insulates these tools from review or intervention, preserving 
the status quo.  At best, they reflect the world around us.  At worst, they 
perpetuate “the New Jim Code,” the term given to “new technologies that 
reflect and reproduce existing inequities” while being “promoted and 
perceived as more objective or progressive than the discriminatory systems 
of a prior era.”20 
Reformers who seek to use these tools in the criminal legal system can 
and should only do so when they design, deploy, and implement them with a 
basic understanding of the nature of racial inequality.  This idea requires that 
their proponents keep a fundamental truth in mind.  That truth, which 
American history verifies, is that “[r]acial equality is, in fact, not a realistic 
goal.”21  Simply put, racial inequality is a permanent feature of the institutions 
that govern us and the society within which we exist.  Or to put it in terms 
that technologists are likely to understand, racism is a feature, not a bug of 
American life.  It is woven into the fabric of our country.  
Accordingly, “[e]ven those herculean efforts we hail as successful will 
produce no more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories 
that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white 
dominance.”22  To the extent we hope to see more peaks of progress during 
our lifetimes than valleys of despair, we would do well to accept this premise 
as true and respond accordingly.  That means that rather than attempt to solve 
or eradicate racism, we should account for the role that racism plays as we 
design, implement, and engage in oversight of these tools.  The evolving 
policy debate on the use of algorithmic tools provides us with an opportunity 
to do just that. 
 
 20. RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM 
CODE 10 (2019) (emphasis omitted).  
 21. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 363 (1992).  
 22. Id. at 373 (emphasis omitted). 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I explores the basic nature, 
character, and history of algorithmic tools across various stages of the 
criminal legal system, including an accounting of how they are designed, how 
they work, and the interplay between racial justice and the use of the tools.23  
It complements existing scholarship exposing and addressing the racial 
justice and fairness concerns the tools raise.24  It also builds on my own 
efforts to grapple with the intersection of race and technology25 by 
 
 23. See infra Part I.  
 24. See Southerland, supra note 11 at 3, 22–25 (detailing gathering of leading experts to foster 
insights on algorithmic risk assessment and race); Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of 
Algorithms, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Laura M. Moy, A Taxonomy of Police 
Technology’s Racial Inequity Problems, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 139 (2019); Rashida Richardson, 
Government Data Practices as Necropolitics and Racial Arithmetic, DATA AND PANDEMIC 
POLITICS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://globaldatajustice.org/covid-19/necropolitics-racial-arithmetic; The 
Bias Embedded in Algorithms, POCKET (June 18, 2020), https://blog.getpocket.com/2020/06/the-
bias-embedded-in-algorithms/ (collecting sources on technology and bias); Nicolás Rivero, The 
Influential Project That Sparked the End Of IBM’s Facial Recognition Program, QUARTZ (June 10, 
2020), https://qz.com/1866848/why-ibm-abandoned-its-facial-recognition-program/ (detailing how 
Timnit Gebru, Joy Buolamwini, and Inioluwa Raji have shaped policy through their research); Some 
Essential Reading and Research On Race and Technology, MACHINE (June 2, 2020), 
https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/02/some-essential-reading-and-research-on-race-and-technology/ 
(collecting research on race, technology, and bias); Marie Hicks, Fixing Tech’s Built-In Bias, 
AMERICAN SCIENTIST, https://www.americanscientist.org/article/fixing-techs-built-in-bias 
(reviewing literature on race and technology); UCLA Center for Critical Internet Inquiry, Essential 
Books by Black Scholars on Technology, Science, and Race, https://www.c2i2.ucla.edu/racial-
justice-and-tech/ (collecting sources); Rachel Courtland, Bias Detectives: The Researchers Striving 
to Make Algorithms Fair, NATURE (June 20, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-
05469-3 (identifying researchers engaged in algorithmic justice work); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, 
Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 
MINN. L. REV. 303, 341 (2018); Brandon Buskey & Andrea Woods, Making Sense of Pretrial Risk 
Assessment, CHAMPION, June 2018; John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: 
Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725 (2018); Sonja Starr, 
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
803 (2014). 
 25. See SOUTHERLAND, supra note 11; Vincent Southerland, With AI and Criminal Justice, the 
Devil is in the Data, ACLU BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data.  From 2018-2019, I 
served on an expert Research Advisory Council to provide guidance and consultation as New York 
City redesigned its pretrial release assessment instrument.  Luminosity & the University of 
Chicago’s Crime Lab New York, Updating the New York City Criminal Justice Agency Release 
Assessment 1, 2, 43–44 (June 2020), https://www.nycja.org/assets/Updating-the-NYC-Criminal-
Justice-Agency-Release-Assessment-Final-Report-June-2020.pdf.  I also served on New York 
City’s Automated Decision Systems Task Force, the first of its kind in the United States, which was 
established in 2018 and charged with recommending a process for reviewing the City’s use of 
automated decision systems.  See New York City Automated Decision Systems Task Force Report, 
N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf; Rashida 
Richardson, Jason M. Schultz, & Vincent M. Southerland, Litigating Algorithms 2019 US Report: 
New Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems, AI NOW INST. (Sept.2019). 
https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.html. 
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underscoring a truth common to the current menu of algorithmic tools: that 
if we proceed along our present course, we can at best expect the reification 
of the pervasive inequities of today.  
Part II addresses the potential solutions to the concerns raised by risk 
assessments in the criminal system.26  It expands on a growing body of 
scholarship that grapples with the intersection of race, algorithmic tools, and 
the law,27 to produce a series of policy recommendations for how we design, 
deploy, and assess technological tools in the criminal system.  Those policy 
recommendations include acknowledging the permanence of racism; putting 
the onus on system actors and tool designers to demonstrate that they do not 
perpetuate racial harms, regardless of the intent of those who seek to use 
them; turning the tools on the actors in the system to scrutinize their behavior; 
and emphasizing qualitative narratives over quantitative data as we press for 
a system of individualized justice that values the dignity of those facing its 
punishing power.  
Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications of using a racial 
justice framework and the interventions I have suggested.28  The 
recommendations set forth in this Article proceed from the premise that 
algorithmic tools have the potential to do just as much, if not more, harm than 
good.  Immediate abolition of them or the system in which they operate is 
unlikely.  But the implementation of the recommendations has the potential 
to bring us one step closer to a criminal legal system radically different than 
the one we currently employ.  Such a system is one in which we have chosen 
to divest from policing, jails, prisons, and punishment and to invest in 
education, employment, health, and social welfare.  That amounts to a 
transformation of our criminal system rather than a reform of it.  
I. ALGORITHMIC TOOLS IN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
To begin the examination of the intersection of race and algorithmic 
tools, it is important to explore the suite of normative concerns and practical 
challenges that the tools raise at various stages of the criminal system.  That 
focus will unearth the problems presented by the data the tools rely on, the 
targets that those who traditionally wield them choose, and the critical 
 
 26. See infra Part II.  
 27. See generally Sean Hill, Bail Reform & the (False) Racial Promise of Algorithmic Risk 
Assessment, UCLA L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming) (applying a racial justice framework rooted in 
critical race theory to analyze pretrial risk assessments and bail reform in New York and California); 
BENJAMIN, supra note 20 (applying and synthesizing critical race theory and algorithmic tools); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (2019) (analyzing the 
role of race, big data, automation, and computerized prediction in the criminal legal system). 
 28. See infra Part III.  
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questions that the tools fail to contemplate.  By considering these problems 
in the context of the tools being used in policing, pretrial decision-making, 
and sentencing, this Part will offer an analytical frame to explore how the 
theoretical problems play out in practice.29  Ultimately, this Part demonstrates 
that if we continue to use these tools in their current configuration, we will 
only succeed in replicating the bias, racism, and inequity that currently 
characterizes and consumes the criminal legal system. 
A. Brief Introduction to Algorithmic Tools 
We begin with a working definition of algorithmic tools.  As used in this 
Article, this term refers to any tools that use statistical data related to past 
behavior and other relevant traits to predict present or future criminal 
behavior with the objective of informing decisionmakers about the 
appropriate criminal legal system outcome or response.30 
A helpful distinction can be drawn between two sets of tools—
predictive tools, which attempt to forecast a particular event or outcome, and 
surveillance tools, which are used to monitor people, places, and things.  The 
focus of this Article is on predictive tools, which fall within the larger field 
of predictive analytics: “the use of statistically analyzed data to predict future 
outcomes.”31  This feature—the analysis and use of group-level data to 
 
 29. Two points are worth raising.  First, while I discuss the problems with the tools at specific 
stages, those problems are not at all limited to those stages.  Each stage provides a lens through 
which we can see how algorithmic tools operate in practice.  It is very much the case that the 
problems with the design and use of an actuarial tool in, for example, policing may present 
themselves at bail or sentencing.  Second, it is also true that in their deployment and implementation, 
the tools that I discuss produce additional problems that are worthy of attention.  Accordingly, the 
concerns I have raised are not exhaustive but are intended to capture the broader challenges that the 
tools present.  
 30. The term algorithmic tool encompasses what are commonly known as actuarial risk 
assessments, predictive instruments that use “statistical rather than clinical methods on large 
datasets of criminal offending rates” and other data deemed relevant to the decision-making process 
“to determine different levels of offending” or behavior “associated with one or more group traits”  
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial 
Age 3 (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2008); see also Huq, supra note 11, at 1060 (“Algorithmic 
criminal justice . . . is the application of an automated protocol to a large volume of data to classify 
new subjects in terms of the probability of expected criminal activity and in relation to the 
application of state coercion.”); Mayson, supra  note 24, at 2228 (referring to “criminal justice risk 
assessment” as “the actuarial assessment of the likelihood of some future event, usually arrest for 
crime.”); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the 
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1752 (2018) (“Typically, risk assessment tools use 
data about groups of people, like those who have been arrested or convicted, to assess the probability 
of future behavior.”). 
 31. Jessica M. Eaglin, Predictive Analytics’ Punishment Mismatch, 14 I/S: J/L & POL’Y FOR 
INFO SOC’Y 87, 87 (2017). 
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forecast individual behavior—is common to all predictive algorithmic tools32 
across the criminal legal system. 
Algorithmic tools carry with them the promise that they will inform and 
improve decision-making by the actors employing them.  Naturally, 
discretion provides an entry point for biases to operate, producing unfair 
outcomes that flow from those biases.  Given the centrality of race to the 
critiques often leveled at the criminal legal system, it should come as no 
surprise that proponents of algorithmic tools justify their development and 
use, in part, because they seek to confront and eradicate systemic racial bias 
and curb biased decision-making.  Accordingly, the tools are marketed as 
race neutral—free from the biases that plague human decision-making,33 
ultimately yielding decisions that are free from bias.  Practice, theory, and 
history paint a different picture—one that is worth confronting if we are ever 
to advance justice.  
What follows is an accounting of the development and use of these tools 
in policing, pretrial justice, and sentencing.34  That accounting is framed by 
the concerns these tools raise: specifically that they yield biased forecasts 
because they utilize biased data; that they are aimed at those already targeted 
by the criminal legal system rather than actors in it; and that they encourage 
profiling.  
B. Algorithmic Tools and Policing 
1. Theory  
The first iteration of algorithmic tools in policing traces back to the 
twentieth century and the rise of “environmental criminology,” which 
 
 32. See supra notes 29 and 30.   
 33. The vendors themselves are consistent sources of this marketing. Predictive Policing: 
Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, PREDPOL http://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-
policing-works/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (“No demographic, ethnic or socio-economic information 
is ever used.  This eliminates the possibility for privacy or civil rights violations seen with other 
intelligence-led policing models.”); Predictive Policing Research Breaks New Ground in 
Philadelphia, YAHOO! FIN., (Oct. 17, 2013), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/predictive-policing-
research-breaks-ground-130000154.html (“Not only does HunchLab enable the combination of 
many data sources and the intelligent use of temporal patterns, but the new predictive model also 
enables the prioritization of patrols based on societal impact and local priorities.  This data-driven 
process leads to resource allocations that accurately and fairly reflect societal priorities for public 
safety, unbiased by neighborhood affluence, race or ethnicity.”); COMPAS Risk & Needs 
Assessment System, NORTHPOINTE (2012) 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/FAQ_Document.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) 
(“The tool works well between genders and ethnicities.”).  
 34. See supra note 30 (providing explanations of how algorithmic tools work). 
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focused on the “geography of crime.”35  The idea was to identify and map 
patterns of criminal behavior to inform policing.36  Over time, the same maps 
evolved into digital maps of reported crimes using historical crime data.37  
Police departments eventually hired crime analysts to synthesize crime data 
and to assist law enforcement with the deployment of limited policing 
resources.38  
William Bratton, the Commissioner of the New York City Police 
Department (“NYPD”), and Jack Maple, the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner 
for Crime Control Strategies,39 pioneered data-centered policing.40  The two 
developed CompStat, which allowed police leadership to examine reported 
crime statistics and engage in targeted enforcement to address and reduce 
crime, measured by arrest rates.41  These tactics grew out of concerns about 
systemic corruption in the NYPD and political pressure to address high levels 
of crime.42  Data, law enforcement policymakers thought, fostered 
accountability and professionalism, while reducing crime.43  When Bratton 
 
 35. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 1109, 1123 
(2017). 
 36. Id. at 1123.  
 37. Id. at 1124. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bratton served two terms as NYPD Commissioner, from 1994 to 1996 and from 2014 to 
2016. Al Baker & J. David Goodman, Bratton, Who Shaped an Era in Policing, Tries to Navigate 
a Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/nyregion/william-bratton-new-york-city-police-
commissioner.html.  The development of data-centered policing took place during his first term.  Id.  
Maple, for his part, in the 1980s “mapped every train and train station in New York City.”  He 
would then use “crayons to mark every violent crime, robbery and grand larceny that occurred,” 
indicating the solved and the unsolved.  Predictive Crime Fighting, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/crimefighting/ (last visited January 8, 2020).  
“Using these maps, police officers knew which neighborhoods were being hit by what crimes, and 
could more efficiently patrol and assist those areas.  It was an important first step toward 
consolidating police data into a tool for crime analysis and prevention.”  Id.  The post 9/11 era has 
seen a proliferation of data-centered policing, as traditional policing expanded to include anti-
terrorism and sought to collect and analyze data in keeping with that mission.  Paul Hamrick, 
Fighting Crime with Data: Law Enforcement in the 21st Century, FORENSIC FOCUS, (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.forensicfocus.com/articles/fighting-crime-with-data-law-enforcement-in-the-21st-
century/. 
 40. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, 
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 29 (2017). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.; see also Predictive Crime Fighting, supra note 39. 
 43. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 30.  It is worth noting that a drop in New York City’s crime 
rate did coincide with the adoption of CompStat, though it is unclear how much CompStat 
contributed to that decline.  Chris Smith, The Controversial Crime-Fighting Program That Changed 
Big-City Policing Forever, N.Y. MAG., (Mar. 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/the-
crime-fighting-program-that-changed-new-york-forever.html.  While “CompStat has helped drive 
down the city’s crime rates to historic lows and revolutionized policing around the world,” it also 
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moved from the NYPD to the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) in 
2002, he brought his CompStat approach to another police department reeling 
from scandal, fraud, and corruption.44  
Thus began the first efforts to develop predictive policing technologies.  
Working with academics at area universities, the LAPD experimented with 
an algorithm to forecast the locations of potential criminal activity.45  In 
practice, the analysts fed the algorithm historical crime data to predict the 
likely location of criminal activity.46  The program focused on property 
crimes—specifically burglary, automobile theft, and theft of items from 
automobiles.47  A seemingly objective set of considerations informed that 
focus.  First, this suite of crimes generated concern over public safety, tended 
to be reported and were, therefore, measurable.  They could also be addressed 
by policing practices; they arose from “environmental vulnerabilities” that 
policing could remedy, and an increased police presence could operate as a 
deterrent.48  
The algorithm produced forecasts of criminal activity in geographically 
precise areas.49  Police received maps of those areas and instructions to visit 
them as often as practicable while on patrol.50  Criminological theory 
informed practice—resting on the notion that property crimes tend to spread 
like viruses, either because the environment encourages them or because the 
same people return to commit them again.51  Additional variables, like the 
weather, time of day, proximity to an event, or seasons, provided additional 
data points for prediction.52 
Property crime prediction proved to be just the starting point.  Two 
additional versions of predictive policing were developed.  The place-based, 
property-crime-focused iteration of predictive policing evolved to target 
violent crime.53  Driving this evolutionary change was the theory that violent 
crime is the product of particular environmental conditions—a dimly lit alley, 
proximity to potential victims, gang-related disputes for control over specific 
 
fueled a stop and frisk policing regime that led to the harassment of countless New Yorkers of color, 
driving “considerable debate on just how much credit CompStat, and the NYPD in general, deserves 
for the crime decline.”  Id.  
 44. See FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 29. 
 45. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1126. 
 46. Id. at 1127. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1126–27. 
 49. Id. at 1127. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 1128 
 52. Id. at 1129. 
 53. Id. at 1132. 
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territory.54  Thus, like place-based, property-crime-focused predictive 
policing, this iteration relied on the notion that “place-based environmental 
vulnerabilities exist that encourage violent crime, and thus should create a 
higher risk that crime will occur in that location.”55  
The third iteration of predictive policing represented more of a 
transformational change.  Police began to use “predictive technologies to 
identify individuals and groups involved in predicted criminal activity.”56  
Like the relationships between crime and environmental factors that 
undergird place-based systems, person-based systems rest on the notion that 
“negative social networks . . . can encourage criminal activity.”57  This third 
mode of predictive policing assumes that a small portion of the population 
possesses an elevated risk of becoming the victim or perpetrator of violence, 
and that these individuals can be mapped out as a social network to be 
pinpointed, marked, and surveilled.58  The result is a shift from “hot spots” 
where crime might occur to “hot people” who may engage in (or be victims 
of) violence.59  Technological advances allowed for intelligence collection 
and surveillance of suspected individuals and criminal networks, eventually 
leading to interventions by law enforcement that range from warnings of 
harsh punishment for targets to increased surveillance.60 
2. Practice  
The record on predictive policing technology is mixed at best.  An 
accounting of initial success in property crime reductions in several 
California cities—such as Los Angeles, Santa Cruz, Alhambra, and Modesto, 
along with positive results in Seattle and Atlanta—have been undermined by 
tests that showed inconclusive results or spikes in crime following initial 
drops.61  Boston saw a reduction in violent crime after policing targeted 
locations where shootings were more likely to take place.62  Likewise, the 
city of New Orleans saw a steep decline in its homicide rate after 
implementing a strategy to target and investigate a cohort of individuals with 
the highest risk of being involved in gun violence.63  
 
 54. Id. at 1132–33. 
 55. Id. at 1137. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 1138.  
 59. Id. at 1140. 
 60. Id. at 1140–43. 
 61. Id. at 1130. 
 62. Id. at 1134. 
 63. Id. at 1142.  The New Orleans predictive policing experiment ended in 2018, when New 
Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu declined to renew the city’s partnership with Palantir, a Palo Alto 
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Yet even these modest successes must be weighed against the potential 
harm that flows from the use of these tools.  In 2016, the Human Rights Data 
Analysis Group (“HRDAG”) reproduced the algorithm utilized by PredPol, 
a predictive policing software that dozens of police departments nationwide 
have adopted.64  PredPol’s software consults historical crime data to forecast 
particular areas—so-called hotspots—that officers should target on a given 
day.65  The HRDAG researchers inputted crime data from Oakland, 
California in order to use the PredPol software to forecast potential drug 
crime.66  In response, the algorithm advised the police to target low-income 
neighborhoods of color, despite concurrent evidence from public health data 
that drug use is more evenly dispersed throughout the city, and that policing 
should likewise be more evenly dispersed.67  This disparity, HRDAG 
contended, is because officer explicit and implicit biases rooted in race about 
who to stop, search, and arrest, plagued the records utilized to inform the 
data, such that the algorithm almost necessarily reproduces accumulated 
patterns of biased over-policing.68  Thus, when informed by discriminatory 
data, the algorithm will work to encourage similarly discriminatory police 
behavior.69 
 
based data analytics company.  Jonathan Bullington & Emily Lane, New Orleans ends its 
relationship With Tech Firm Palantir, Landrieu’s Office says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2018/03/palantir_new_orleans_gang_case.html. 
Unbeknownst to the New Orleans City Council or the public, Palantir had been operating in New 
Orleans for six years.  Ali Winston, Palantir Has Secretly Been Using New Orleans to Test Its 
Predictive Policing Technology, VERGE (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-new-orleans-
nopd.  
 64. Katia Savchuk, Justice by The Numbers: Meet the Statistician Trying to Fix Bias in 
Criminal Justice Algorithms, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/social-
justice/justice-by-the-numbers-meet-the-statistician-trying-to-fix-bias-in-criminal-justice-
algorithms.  
 65. Id.; see also Overview, PredPol, https://www.predpol.com/about/ (PredPol’s software 
“identif[ies] the times and locations where specific crimes are most likely to occur . . . based on on 
victimization information.”).  
 66. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 17 (2016). The 
results of Lum and Isaac’s study have been saddled with the qualification that PredPol is not used 
to predict drug crimes. Jack Smith IV, Crime-Prediction Tool PredPol Amplifies Racially Biased 
Policing, Study Shows, MIC (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-
tool-pred-pol-only-amplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows.  This qualification, while valid, 
does not detract from what the study demonstrated: “the potential for predictive policing software 
to perpetuate historical biases in enforcement.”  William Isaac & Kristian Lum, Setting the Record 
Straight on Predictive Policing and Race, MEDIUM (Jan. 3, 2018), https://medium.com/in-justice-
today/setting-the-record-straight-on-predictive-policing-and-race-fe588b457ca2. 
 67. Lum & Isaac, supra note 66, at 17. 
 68. Id. at 15.  
 69. Id.   
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Person-based predictive systems suffer from similar shortcomings.  A 
RAND Corporation70 study of the Chicago Police Department’s (“CPD”) 
Strategic Subject List (“SSL”) is a helpful example.  The SSL is “a 
computerized assessment tool that incorporates numerous sources of 
information to analyze crime as well as identifies and ranks individuals at 
risk of becoming a victim or possible offender in a shooting or homicide.”71  
Developed by the Illinois Institute of Technology, and utilized by the CPD 
as early as 2012, this tool assigns risk tiers to individuals based on variables, 
like an individual’s age during their latest arrest, the number of times they 
have been apprehended for use of an unlawful weapon, and the number of 
times they have been a victim of aggravated assault and battery.72  Because 
the majority of these variables rely upon arrest records rather than actual 
convictions, however, the SSL runs a high risk of including individuals who 
have not even committed a crime, and of reflecting the CPD’s biased policing 
practices.73  Indeed, research demonstrated that the SSL led to increased 
contact with those who were already in frequent contact with law 
enforcement.74  What is worse, the SSL did not reduce gun violence, even as 
the number of individuals on the list tripled over three years.75 
 
 70. According to its website, “The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops 
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more 
secure, healthier and more prosperous.”  About the RAND Corporation, RAND CORP., 
https://www.rand.org/about.html (last visited June 1, 2021).  RAND describes its history as follows: 
“On May 14, 1948, Project RAND—an organization formed immediately after World War II to 
connect military planning with research and development decisions—separated from the Douglas 
Aircraft Company of Santa Monica, California, and became an independent, nonprofit organization. 
Adopting its name from a contraction of the term research and development, the newly formed 
entity was dedicated to furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for 
the public welfare and security of the United States.”  History and Mission, RAND CORP., 
https://www.rand.org/about/history.html (last visted June 1, 2021).  
 71. Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact 
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 31 (2019) 
 72. Id. 
 73. An arrest of a particular nature and character does not always yield a conviction of the same 
nature and character for the individual arrested, especially in those instances when law enforcement 
authorities engage in biased policing.  Id. at 28–29, 29 n.57 (citing a Department of Justice 
investigatory report that found the Chicago Police Department’s pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct resulted in false arrests and convictions of incalculable proportion). 
 74. David Robinson & Logan Koepke, UPTURN, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON 
“PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 9 (2016), https://www.upturn.org/ 
static/reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/files/Upturn_-_Stuck_In_a_Pattern_v.1.01.pdf.  
 75. Id.  Notably, the Chicago Police Department decommissioned the SSL in January 2020 
following a report by the Office of Inspector General detailing myriad problems with the program.  
Sam Charles, CPD Decommissions ‘Strategic Subject List’, CHI. SUN –TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020, 
2:11pm), https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/1/27/21084030/chicago-police-strategic-
subject-list-party-to-violence-inspector-general-joe-ferguson.  Those problems included “the 
unreliability of risk scores and tiers; improperly trained sworn personnel; a lack of controls for 
internal and external access; interventions influenced by . . . risk models which may have attached 
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Significant harms can flow from an algorithmic tool that targets policing 
in particular communities and suggests repeatedly returning to those 
communities.76  For example, more interactions between Black people and 
police make Black people vulnerable to violence at the hands of law 
enforcement; increases the likelihood of arrest; and fosters likely 
involvement with the criminal legal system, driving up rates of arrest and 
incarceration.77  Repeated exposure to police tends to increase the 
vulnerability of those policed to “violence-producing insecurities” that 
officers experience during encounters.78  Finally, Black people who come 
into frequent (and unwarranted) contact with law enforcement develop a 
decreased perception of police legitimacy, which can cause them to “resist 
police authority, assert rights, or flee upon seeing or encountering the police, 
each of which increases the likelihood of police violence.”79 
Despite the real world harms these tools can produce, it is hard to argue 
with the use of technology when success is defined as less crime, more cases 
cleared, and a greater sense of public safety for some segment of society.  On 
those terms, even the minimal success of these tools allows justice actors who 
seek to use them to ignore a number of questionable assumptions under the 
veneer of a technological solution.80  Chief among those assumptions is one 
of the basic vulnerabilities of all actuarial risk assessments raised by the 
problems revealed through studies of predictive policing tools: bad data. 
 
negative consequences to arrests that did not result in convictions; and a lack of a long-term plan to 
sustain the . . . models.”  Id. (quoting Office of Inspector General) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 76. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the 
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1509 (2016) (noting that heightened police interactions with Black 
communities not only reflects, but also reinforces racial stereotypes of Black people as violent and 
dangerous). 
 77. Id. at 1508–11.  
 78. Id.  One example of this phenomenon is “‘masculinity threat,’ which is an officer’s sense 
that his masculinity is being undermined or challenged during an interaction.”  Id.  Officers who 
experience this phenomenon are, on balance, more likely to deploy violence than those who do not.  
Id; see also L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 115, 128–42 (2014) (defining and discussing masculinity threat and its relationship to 
racial violence).  
 79. Carbado, supra note 76, at 1511; see also CIVIL RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), at 7. 
 80. In June 2020, the city of Santa Cruz, California, recognizing the concerns raised by 
predictive policing, became the first American city to bar its use.  Nicholas Ibarra, Santa Cruz, 
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3. Critique: Flawed Data as Destiny and Garbage In, Garbage Out 
Data is the lifeblood of all predictive technology.  In the context of the 
criminal legal system, data is rife with imperfections and is irreversibly 
tainted by racism and the social hierarchies it produces and supports.81  Those 
indelible flaws are, in large part, the byproduct of the nature of crime data—
police do not just use data—they create the data that algorithmic tools and 
technologies depend on.82  Thus, police decision-making plays an outsized 
role in shaping our perceptions of crime and criminal behavior.83  The 
vulnerabilities in the data start with simple, innocent, human error: People 
can make mistakes in data collection, input, integration of datasets, and 
cleansing to remedy duplicative entries.84  Data can also be incomplete, as its 
creation is often wholly dependent on actors within the criminal legal 
system—both the consumers and the consumed.85  Everything from the 
underreporting of crime by communities that have lost faith in law 
enforcement, or have some other reason not to report crime,86 to the 
manipulation of crime statistics87 by police can produce data that paints an 
incomplete portrait of a community—and therefore an incomplete and flawed 
field of vision for a predictive policing tool.  
Another source of this flawed data problem, independent from the 
motivations of the stat-juking officer, emerges from the nature of interactions 
between police and citizens.  Arrest statistics, which mark the point of contact 
between law enforcement and alleged perpetrators, are not updated to reflect 
 
 81. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
503, 504 (2018) (explaining that all big data policing technologies suffer from a lack of 
transparency, racial bias, and legal uncertainty).  
 82. Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data & Algorithms, 26 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 287, 289 (2017) (emphasis omitted).  
 83. Id. at 290. 
 84. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1145–46. 
 85. Id. at 1146–47; see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT 
PERMISSION 266–68 (2017) (detailing the potential ways data can be erroneous given how it is 
gathered). 
 86. See P. Jeffrey Brantingham, The Logic of Data Bias and its Impact on Place-Based 
Predictive Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 473, 475 (2018) (explaining that crime is substantially 
underreported across crime types by all racial groups, though at varying degrees); see also Ferguson, 
supra note 81, at 514–16 (describing differences in crime reporting by communities of color and 
for particular types of crime). 
 87. Matt Hamilton, LAPD Captain Accuses Department of Twisting Crime Statistics to Make 
City Seem Safer, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-
crime-stats-claim-20171103-story.html; see also Brantingham, supra note 86, at 475 (“A related 
source of bias is police intentionally undercounting crime either through intentional mislabeling or 
failing to report” stemming from “perverse incentives for police to make the world seem better than 
it actually is.”). 
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how the arrest was resolved by the criminal legal system.88  Cases that the 
government dismisses, or those that resolve with a plea on charges less 
serious than those for which an arrest was made, or those where an accused 
person accepts a plea to charged conduct that they did not in fact commit, 
will naturally skew the data and likewise present a distorted  picture of when 
and where crime is occurring and who is responsible for it.89  For example, 
an individual may be arrested for a robbery and charged accordingly (or 
institutional pressures may lead a prosecutor to charge the most serious 
offense consistent with the facts presented).  Ultimately, that case may be 
resolved with a guilty plea to a lesser charge—such as assault or theft—that 
more closely aligns with the behavior of the accused.  Traditional crime data 
would reflect the robbery, rather than the ultimate, less serious outcome.  
What is reflected and read in the data is a community that appears to be 
dramatically more dangerous than it actually is. 
Compounding the concerns raised by these serious shortcomings is the 
fact that the most pressing data-related problems occur at the intersection of 
race: biased data.90  Simply put, “[p]olice data remains colored by explicit 
and implicit bias.  Police data is racially coded, shaded by millions of 
distrustful looks and thousands of discomfiting physical encounters.”91  A 
cursory examination of policing practices reveals the pervasive influence of 
bias—and racial bias in particular—on law enforcement.92  
 
 88. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 133–34 
(2018). 
 89. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. (Nov. 20 2014), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/; Walter Pavlo, 
Are Innocent People Pleading Guilty? A New Report Says Yes, FORBES (July 31 2018, 8:06 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2018/07/31/are-innocent-people-pleading-guilty-a-new-
report-says-yes/?sh=2858edea5193; Jed S. Rakoff, WHY THE INNOCENT PLEAD GUILTY AND THE 
GUILTY GO FREE (2021). 
 90. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1148–49. 
 91. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 131–32.  
 92. Balko, supra note 3 (collecting seventeen studies produced examining data from 2002 
detailing racial bias and discriminatory policing). Rooting out misconduct and bias is incredibly 
challenging, given that there are more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide.  CIVIL 
RTS. DIV., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND 
PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 1 (Jan. 2017).  Since 1994, the Department of 
Justice’s Civil Rights Division has had the authority to investigate and litigate cases involving 
patterns or practices by law enforcement that violate the Constitution or federal civil rights statutes.  
Id. at 3.  Since the Division began that work, it has opened sixty-nine formal investigations and 
entered into forty reform agreements addressing their investigatory findings.  Id.  See Richardson et 
al., supra note 71, at 199–202 (describing how criminal legal system data is reflective of biased 
police practices).  
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Behind the deaths of George Floyd, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir 
Rice, Philando Castille, Stephon Clark, Pamela Turner, Korryn Gaines,93 and 
countless other people of color killed by the police are staggering data points 
that underscore the racism that pervades policing.94  Black people are more 
likely than their white counterparts to be stopped, searched, arrested, and 
victimized by the police.95  A 2019 analysis of 100 million municipal and 
state patrol traffic stops from dozens of jurisdictions nationwide over a 
decade revealed that Black drivers are 20% more likely to be pulled over than 
their white counterparts.96  The same analysis determined that the threshold 
for searching Black and Latino drivers was lower than that applied to their 
white counterparts, meaning that searches of Black and Latino drivers were 
premised on fewer contextual factors that give rise to suspicion than searches 
of white drivers.97  For young men of color, police force is among the leading 
causes of death.98  About 1 in 1,000 Black men and boys can expect to lose 
their lives to police violence—a risk 2.5 times higher than that of their white 
peers.99  On the whole, Black people are three times more likely to be killed 
by police.100  These numbers, along with the incidents they represent, led to 
investigations by the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, which 
found widespread racially discriminatory policing practices in places like 
 
 93. In 2019 alone, 999 people were shot and killed by the police, 249 of whom were Black, 163 
of whom were Hispanic (for a total of 367 non-white victims) and 405 of whom were white, with 
the remainder reported as being of unknown or other races.  Fatal Force, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/ (Aug. 10, 2020).  
For a sampling of media reports regarding this phenomena, see 110 Black Men And Boys Killed By 
Police, NEWONE (May 5, 2021), https://newsone.com/playlist/black-men-boy-who-were-killed-by-
police/item/53; #SayHerName: Black Women And Girls Killed By Police, NEWSONE (Oct. 14, 
2019), https://newsone.com/playlist/black-women-girls-police-killed-photos/item/1. 
 94. See Mapping Police Violence, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ (last updated February 
16, 2021) (providing a comprehensive statistical examination of police violence and deaths at the 
hands of law enforcement since 2013). 
 95. Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in 
the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. JUST. (May 2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-
web-assets/downloads/Publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden/legacy_downloads/for-the-
record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf. 
 96. Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across 
The United States, 4 NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 736, 737 (2019), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0858-1. 
 97. Id. at 6. 
 98. Frank Edwards et. al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by 
Age, Race–Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,793, 16,793 
https://www.pnas.org/content/116/34/16793. 
 99. Amina Khan, Getting Killed by Police is a Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men 
in America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2019-08-
15/police-shootings-are-a-leading-cause-of-death-for-black-men. 
 100. Mapping Police Violence, supra note 94.  
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Ferguson, Missouri; Newark, New Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland; New York, 
New York; and Chicago, Illinois.101 
Given the racialized nature of policing, it should come as no surprise 
that law enforcement practices have generated biased data.  Reliance on 
biased data by predictive policing tools has the potential to produce 
devastating consequences.102  Predictive policing tools “look[ ] at crime in 
one geographic area, incorporate[ ] it into historical patterns,”103 and deliver 
a prediction that often justifies a continued or increased police presence in a 
particular community.104  The effect is twofold.105  First, targeting of law 
enforcement resources in a specific community based on past policing 
patterns may lead to more arrests of individuals in that community, giving 
the impression that members of that community are more likely to engage in 
criminal behavior.106  Second, the mere presence of law enforcement 
guarantees an increase in arrests, and, in turn, the creation of more bad data.  
The result is a “pernicious feedback loop”, where “[t]he policing itself 
spawns new data, which then justifies more policing.”107 
In other words, human fallibilities that track racial inequities taint the 
precise data on which we focus these tools.  For example, a host of factors 
feed into the discretion exercised by officers deciding whether to make a stop 
and arrest.  Those factors might relate to the dynamics of the interaction 
between suspect and officer.  The wishes of a complainant can affect both the 
decision to charge and the nature of the charge.  The incentives for increased 
or decreased enforcement affect officers’ decisions about formal intervention 
versus informal resolution of misconduct.108  These variables shape the data 
 
 101. For a summary of the findings of DOJ’s work in these jurisdictions, see CIVIL RTS. DIV., 
supra note 92.’  
 102. Indeed, civil rights leader Roy Wilkins, the Executive Secretary and Executive Director of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from 1955 through 1977, 
expressed this precise concern with the advent of computers in a 1967. See MCILWAIN, supra note 
6, at 242 (“He knew that white America associated black people with crime.  He was afraid that that 
association, and data that confirmed it, would be fed into, ingested in, and processed by a powerful 
new computer system—one that stored, connected, and distributed large amounts of decision-
driving data that could negatively impact black people’s lives.”). 
 103. CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 75 (2016). 
 104. Ferguson, supra note 35, at 1148–49. 
 105. See Brantingham, supra note 86 at 475 (describing how implicit bias can affect a place 
based predictive policing models). 
 106. Selbst, supra note 88, at 134–35. 
 107. O’Neill, supra note 103, at 87. 
 108. See Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1543, 1580-81 (2019) (noting that the enforcement of traffic violations runs the 
risk of police officers exercising broad discretion to stop drivers for impermissible reasons such as 
race).  
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generated.109  A mountain of evidence demonstrates that race is one of those 
variables.110  It has the capacity to shape everything about police practices, 
from interactions between officers and citizens to law enforcement priorities.  
Even if race is not the principle motivating factor, its influence is 
reflected in law enforcement data.  Machine learning algorithms, which learn 
how to reproduce the data they are fed, will naturally reproduce that biased 
data.111  Predictive systems, then, will identify people and locations that 
reflect prior police interactions.112  Thus, despite the fact that “[n]one of the 
algorithms use race in their model (and in fact strip it out) . . . the 
technologies end up targeting communities of color.”113  In short, at best, 
predictive policing tools premised on biased data will reflect that biased data, 
reinforcing the discriminatory forces and race-based assumptions that 
produced it in the first place.  
To be clear, vendors of predictive policing tools, confronted with the 
challenges of bad data, have made efforts to cleanse their products of the taint 
of racism.  In some instances, they have done so by relying on data points 
that do not explicitly rely on race but correlate with it, like zip code or 
economic status of a particular location.114  These efforts make the link 
between racially tainted data and racially tainted forecasts feel, at first glance, 
like more of a significant risk than a hard and fast reality.115  The assumption 
is that if a vendor does not use a data point that is traditionally tied to race, 
the forecasts produced by the technology will be non-racialized.  This is 
especially true of place-based predictive policing systems.  One such vendor, 
PredPol: 
uses only 3 data points—crime type, crime location, and crime 
date/time—to create its predictions.  No personally identifiable 
information is ever used.  No demographic, ethnic or socio-
economic information is ever used.  This eliminates the possibility 
for privacy or civil rights violations seen with other intelligence-
led or predictive policing models.116   
 
 109. Joh, supra note 82, at 297–301. 
 110. Balko, supra note 3 (detailing the influence of race and racism on the criminal legal system).  
 111. Id. at 300–01; see also supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text; Richardson et al., supra 
note 71,at 192. 
 112. Joh, supra note 82, at 301. 
 113. Ferguson, supra note 81, at 516. 
 114. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 75. 
 115. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Truth About Predictive Policing and Race, APPEAL (Dec. 
7, 2017), https://theappeal.org/the-truth-about-predictive-policing-and-race-b87cf7c070b1/.  
 116. The Three Pillars of Predictive Policing, PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/law-
enforcement/#predPolicing (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (emphasis omitted).  
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Hunchlab generates its forecasts from public reports of crime, 
supplemented with data about the geography, weather patterns, and things 
like the locations of community resources.117  
Unfortunately, these efforts do not fully mitigate the risks of flawed 
data.  Patterns of reported crimes, like policing patterns and nearly everything 
about the criminal legal system, vary by race.118  Tools that look to 
community resources, like the locations of schools, restaurants, liquor 
establishments, and transportation hubs119 have to contend with historical, 
racialized patterns of residential segregation that have produced an uneven 
geographical distribution of such establishments.120  For example, if a 
correlation is drawn between criminal activity and community center 
locations, and those centers are largely found in public housing residences 
 
 117. The CEO of the company which developed and sold Hunchlab in January 2019 detailed 
their efforts to avoid running afoul of civil rights concerns:  
“Forecast places, not people: We would forecast locations with the highest likelihood of 
a crime at a given point in time.  We do not attempt to make predictions about the actions 
of people.  Limit input data to places, not people: We would not use data about people – 
no arrests, no social media, no gang status, no criminal background information. 
Reported events: We would generate forecasts based on public reports of crime, not 
arrests or other data originating in law enforcement activities.  Supplement reported data: 
One way to reduce bias is to draw on multiple sources of data.  We knew that we could 
generate forecasts using just the crime reports, but we believed that by supplementing 
reported crimes with other relevant data, ideally from independent, open sources, we 
could mitigate bias in the reporting data.  Typical examples might include lighting, school 
schedules, locations of community infrastructure, weather, or locations of bars.”  
Robert Cheetham, Why We Sold Hunchlab, AZAVEA (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.azavea.com/blog/2019/01/23/why-we-sold-hunchlab/.  
 118. Caroline Haskins, Academics Confirm Major Predictive Policing Algorithm is 
Fundamentally Flawed, VICE (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwbag4/ 
academics-confirm-major-predictive-policing-algorithm-is-fundamentally-flawed; see also Balko 
supra note 4 (reviewing studies that detail racial bias in the criminal legal system).  
 119.  HunchLab: Under the Hood, AZAVEA 19–20 (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/ 
hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf; see also Maurice Chammah, Policing the Future, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/03/policing-the-
future#.9vrCo3ZOH. 
 120. Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free 
Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 185 (2019) (“Through exclusionary housing policies 
that masquerade as race-neutral principles of rational planning and home rule, homogeneous 
municipalities can, and do, act on their worst biases.  Many local communities exercise their local 
power to relegate poor people of color to marginalized, resource-starved neighborhoods, away from 
the economic prosperity of their own communities.”); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW, 
xvi (2017); see also Danyelle Solomon et. al., Systematic Inequality: Displacement, Exclusion, and 
Segregation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 4, 10 (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2019/08/07/472617/systemic-inequality-
displacement-exclusion-segregation/ (“Racial segregation has contributed to persistent disparities 
in access to public goods—such as parks, hospitals, streetlights, and well-maintained roads—and 
has undermined wealth building in communities of color nationwide.”). 
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inhabited by communities of color, the tools will forecast crime to take place 
in those locations.  
At bottom, this is a case of garbage-in, garbage-out.  Or as some call it, 
“racism in, racism out.”121  The solutions most often posited to address flawed 
data fall short.  That is because no solution can fully erase the vulnerabilities 
of racism, biases, and errors that are embedded in the information used by 
these instruments to produce their forecasts.122  As we will see in the 
following Section, which examines actuarial risk assessment tools and 
pretrial justice, the problem of flawed data is just the first of several 
overarching problems with these tools. 
C. Algorithmic Tools and Pretrial Justice 
1. Theory 
For well over a half century, reformers have engaged in efforts to rethink 
America’s pretrial justice system.123  In its modern form, pretrial justice is 
best understood as the point in the system following arrest and coinciding 
with a prosecutor’s charging decision.  It is at that point when a judge must 
make a decision about whether to detain an individual, release them from law 
enforcement custody, or condition a person’s release from custody on 
meeting an obligation, such as paying a monetary amount to ensure a return 
to court.  The origins of America’s pretrial system trace back over two 
centuries ago to English common law, which presumed release for people 
accused of noncapital crimes barring a serious risk of flight.124  Over the last 
half century, the right to bail has evolved in the United States, incorporating 
an additional consideration of the likelihood that the accused will pose a risk 
to public safety.125  
 
 121. Stephanie Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots—How AI is Learning All of Our Worst 
Impulses,  GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/rise-
of-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses (quoting Hamid Khan, an organizer 
with the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition). 
 122. One solution proposed by researchers is “that every dataset be accompanied with a 
datasheet that documents its motivation, composition, collection process, recommended uses . . .” 
Timnit Gebru et al., Datasheets for Datasets, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 1 (last revised Mar. 20, 2020) 
(working paper), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010v7.pdf.  This solution has “the potential to 
increase transparency and accountability . . . mitigate unwanted biases . . . and help researchers and 
practitioners select more appropriate datasets for their chosen tasks.”  Id. at 2.  Nevertheless, it 
“do[es] not provide a complete solution to mitigating unwanted biases or potential risks or harms.”  
Id. at 10.  
 123. See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 502–09 (2018) 
(describing the development of pretrial justice since the 1960s). 
 124. Crystal Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1410–11 (2017). 
 125. Id. at 1412.  
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Three waves of reform have driven the evolution of pretrial justice.126  
The first wave of reform, which provided the foundation for the current 
pretrial justice regime, culminated in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, signed 
into law by President Lyndon Johnson.127  The law was enacted largely in 
response to a growing chorus of voices decrying the inequities in the system’s 
operation. Judges tended to exercise discretion by setting unaffordable 
money bail amounts that inevitably relegated the poor to pretrial detention.128  
As then-Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy testified before a 
Congressional committee: 
[T]he rich man and the poor man do not receive equal justice in our 
courts.  And in no area is this more evident than in the matter of 
bail. . . . [B]ail has become a vehicle for systematic injustice.  
Every year in this country, thousands of persons are kept in jail for 
weeks and even months following arrest.  They are not yet proven 
guilty.  They may be no more likely to flee than you or I.  But, 
nonetheless, most of them must stay in jail because, to be blunt, 
they cannot afford to pay for their freedom.129   
The Bail Reform Act emphasized “the long-standing objective that bail 
should be used solely to prevent flight risk,” imposing a presumption of 
release unless doing so would undermine the chance that the accused would 
not return to court.130  
The presumption of release and focus on risk of flight shaped bail 
decisions until the early-to-mid 1980s when concerns about public safety and 
pretrial crime prompted a dramatic change and a second wave of reform.131  
States passed laws that allowed for preventive detention—the pretrial 
incarceration of those deemed too dangerous to society to be released.132  
Despite efforts to upend preventive detention, which is rooted in the idea of 
detaining individuals based on the possibility that they pose a danger to 
public safety because they may commit some future offense while their 
criminal case is pending, the Supreme Court upheld the more restrictive 
 
 126. See Mayson, supra note 123, at 502–09 (describing waves of bail reform). 
 127. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, et seq. 
 128. Yang, supra note 124, at 1412–13. 
 129. Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm.  on the Judiciary 88th Cong. 27(1964) 
(statement of Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter Bail 
Legislation].  
 130. Yang, supra note 124, at 1413. 
 131. See Lauryn P. Goldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
837, 847–52 (2016) (describing shift in statutory language to consider dangerousness in bail 
determinations); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (describing consideration of 
dangerousness in federal bail statute as reaction to pretrial crime). 
 132. Yang, supra note 124, at 1413.  
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pretrial regime in United States v. Salerno.133  Salerno marked a sea change 
in pretrial justice, as states nationwide enacted bail legislation that allowed 
courts to explicitly consider the danger the accused poses to the public.134  
Bail reform has come full circle.  The fear that drove the first wave of 
bail reform—that wealth determined who would be freed pretrial—has 
animated the latest series of reform efforts.  Jurisdictions nationwide have 
been prodded by litigation and advocacy to replace their cash-bail-based 
pretrial systems with risk-based systems that employ algorithmic tools called 
pretrial risk assessments to guide release and detention decisions.135  The 
adoption and development of pretrial risk assessments was sparked half a 
century ago by the Manhattan Bail Project, which consisted of a collaboration 
between New York City’s criminal courts and the Vera Institute of Justice.136  
The Manhattan Bail Project introduced the use of a formal questionnaire in 
the pretrial process to elicit information about an accused’s personal 
characteristics and family and community ties that could be assigned point 
values in order to determine whom the courts could safely release pretrial 
without bail.137  The data produced by the Vera effort: 
[P]rovided objective factors to be used in setting release 
conditions.  Scoring each community link and requiring a threshold 
score for release on one’s ‘own recognizance’ created a crude but 
functional actuarial instrument for risk assessment, replacing the 
essentially clinical judgment of a judge who set financial terms on 
the basis of a holistic but subjective evaluation.138 
Today, approximately forty jurisdictions in twenty-eight states use some 
form of pretrial risk assessment instrument.139  Each of these tools aims to 
 
 133. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 134. Yang, supra note 124, at 1414–15. 
 135. Mayson, supra note 123, at 508–09. 
 136. Manhattan Bail Project, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.vera.org/publications/manhattan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-october-1961-
june-1962 (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).   
 137. Preventive Detention in New York: From Mainstream to Margin and Back, CTR. ON THE 
ADMIN. OF CRIM. L.  4–6 (2017), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ 
upload_documents/2017-CACL-New-York-State-Bail-Reform-Paper.pdf.  Attorney General 
Kennedy’s testimony previewed the current embrace of risk assessments, as his testimony before 
Congress pointed to the regime put in place by the Manhattan Bail Project as an example of 
successful bail reform efforts.  Bail Legislation, supra note 129, at 4. 
 138. Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in 
Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 406 (2005). 
 139. Mayson, supra note 123, at 510; PRETRIAL JUST.  INST., SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES 
2019 25 (2019) [hereinafter SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES], https://university.pretrial.org/ 
viewdocument/scan-of-pretrial-practices-pji-20  (“[I]n 2017, approximately one in four people in 
the United States lived in a jurisdiction that employed a validated evidence-based pretrial 
assessment tool, up from one in 10 people in 2013.”). 
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predict who, among the accused, is at risk of being rearrested or failing to 
appear in court.  Some jurisdictions developed these tools on their own, while 
private corporations, foundations, academics, and data scientists developed 
and designed others independently for adoption and use by a jurisdiction.140  
The factors assessed by the tools vary, but prior convictions and pending 
charges are commonly utilized.141  A checklist tool—one that a pretrial 
services agency or court authority administers and determines the presence 
of a list of factors or characteristics—is the most widely used methodology.142  
Statisticians analyze aggregated pretrial data to determine the characteristics 
or traits of an accused person that most closely correlate with the outcome to 
be assessed by the tool.143  Tool makers assign points to those characteristics 
or traits—called risk factors—that correspond to the relationship between the 
factor and the outcome.  A risk score is calculated by determining which risk 
factors apply to the individual being assessed and adding up that score.144  
Some tools do not reveal the weights—or scores—assigned to individual 
factors or reveal what factors are being taken into account.145  Though pretrial 
tools weigh an individual’s risk of re-arrest and failure to appear, “[m]ost of 
the existing instruments produce a single score that represents the risk of 
either one occurring.”146  
This merger of risks is problematic for a number of practical and policy 
reasons.  First, dangerousness and flight are distinct concerns that can lead to 
pretrial detention.  Accordingly, the Federal Bail Reform Act and the 
majority of state bail statutes require that each phenomenon be considered 
separately.147  In many states, while detention may be justified by the flight 
 
 140. An example of this bespoke design process is the effort undertaken by New York City’s 
Criminal Justice Agency, which is responsible for managing the city’s pretrial justice system. 
Release Assessment, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, https://www.nycja.org/release-assessment (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 141. Yang, supra note 124, at 1484. 
 142. See, e.g., supra note 139. 
 143. See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 30, at 1752–54 (describing how pretrial risk 
assessments function); DESMARAIS & LOWDER, supra note 8 (describing different forms of pretrial 
risk assessment and its basic mechanics). 
 144. Mayson, supra note 123, at 509.  
 145. E.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 763–64 (Wis. 2016) (requiring COMPAS to inform 
courts when the company invokes the proprietary nature of its software to “prevent disclosure of 
information relating to how factors are weighed or how risk scores are to be determined”).  Further, 
even among pre-trial risk assessment tools that do disclose their weights, many have not been 
“validated” to show that the algorithm measures what it is intended to measure.  Brandon Buskey 
& Andrea Wood, Making Sense of Pre-trial Risk Assessments, CHAMPION 1, 18 (June 2018), 
https://www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-MakingSenseofPretrialRiskAsses.  Validation studies 
often do not reveal how data points are weighted or what scores serve as cutoffs for different risk 
levels.  Id. 
 146. Mayson, supra note 123, at 509–10.  
 147. Goldin, supra note 131, at 872–84. 
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risk one presents, a statutorily mandated separate finding is required to 
actually impose detention.148  Different conditions of release—electronic 
monitoring or a stay away order instead of cash bail—may flow from a 
separate consideration of flight and dangerousness.149 
From a policy standpoint, merging the two types of risk can lead to an 
inadvertent overestimation of both.  For example, mixing the two may mean 
that a judge’s estimation of flight risk is tainted by fears of one’s risk of 
dangerousness, while estimation of the risk of danger that one may pose may 
be tainted by fears that someone poses a flight risk.150  Combining the two 
forms of risk also prevents judges from understanding and accounting for the 
importance of each risk on its own to their bail determinations.151  
Notwithstanding the concerns that flow from combining risks, states 
nationwide have adopted risk assessment instruments to inform pretrial 
decision-making.152 
2. Practice 
As jurisdictions nationwide adopt pretrial algorithmic tools—
commonly known as pretrial risk assessment instruments—as part of their 
reforms, the efficacy of the tools remains in question.153  At worst, they carry 
the potential to reproduce disparity.154  At best, their introduction is 
accompanied by decarceratory results without changing the racial 
 
 148. Id. at 873. 
 149. Id. at 881–85, 893–97. 
 150. Id. at 886–88. 
 151. Id. at 892–93. 
 152. See SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES, supra note 139, at 25; Matt Henry, Risk Assessment: 
Explained, APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/risk-assessment-
explained (“Nearly every U.S. state and the federal system have implemented risk assessment in 
some form.”). 
 153. Associated Press, Policy Group to Expand Research of Pretrial Risk Assessments, 
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Apr. 25, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1163146/policy-group-
pushes-for-risk-assessment-to-score-defendants.html; David G. Robinson & Logan Koepke, Civil 
Rights and Pretrial Risk Assessment Instruments, SAFETY AND JUST. CHALLENGE 3 (2019), 
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Robinson-Koepke-Civil-
Rights-Critical-Issue-Brief.pdf (“[T]he best available evidence . . . does not clearly establish the 
impacts of these instruments: Although there is no evidence that they decrease public safety, it 
remains unclear whether these tools typically cause substantial and lasting reductions in jailing.”). 
 154. Mayson, supra note 24, at 2251 (“[P]rediction functions like a mirror.  The premise of 
prediction is that, absent intervention, history will repeat itself.  So what prediction does is identify 
patterns in past data and offer them as projections about future events.  If there is racial disparity in 
the data, there will be racial disparity in prediction too.  It is possible to replace one form of disparity 
with another, but impossible to eliminate it altogether.”). 
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disproportionality of a jurisdiction’s detained pretrial population.  The 
evidence of their effectiveness overall is exceedingly thin.155  
New Jersey’s experience is instructive.  The state virtually eliminated 
cash bail in 2014 and overhauled its pretrial justice system entirely, moving 
to a system focused on measuring and forecasting risk of failure to appear or 
threat to public safety to guide judges’ pretrial detention decisions.156  Part of 
that overhaul was the implementation of a pretrial risk assessment 
instrument, the Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”), developed by the Laura 
and John Arnold Foundation, now called Arnold Ventures.157  The PSA 
examines nine so-called “risk factors” to assess the risk of new criminal 
activity—specifically new violent criminal activity—along with the 
likelihood of one’s failure to appear pending the resolution of their case.158  
The factors assessed amount to the accused’s age at current arrest, criminal 
history—including prior violent and nonviolent misdemeanor and felony 
offenses—prior failures to appear, and prior carceral sentences.159 
New Jersey’s turn to risk assessment was made in tandem with a host of 
other changes to its pretrial system.  Among those changes were: a 
presumption that favors release on nonmonetary conditions over monetary 
bail; a narrowing of the grounds on which the accused can be detained 
pretrial; and a requirement that a prosecutor file a detention motion and 
 
 155. Stevenson, supra note 24, at 341 (“[T]here is a sore lack of research on the impacts of risk 
assessment in practice.  There is no evidence on how the use of risk assessment affects racial 
disparities.  There is no evidence that the adoption of risk assessment has led to dramatic 
improvements in either incarceration rates or crime without adversely affecting the other margin.”).  
Stevenson’s research demonstrated that the implementation of bail reform measures in Kentucky 
that included the use of a pretrial risk assessment produced limited decarceratory results and no 
effect on racial disparity:  
[T]he net effects on the overall release rate were small.  Furthermore, they were not 
permanent: the sharp change in practices and outcomes that occurred right after the law 
was implemented eroded over time as judges returned to their previous bail-setting 
practices.  Within a couple of years, the pretrial release rate was lower than it was before 
the bill, and lower than the national average. . . . Once county effects were taken into 
account, racial disparities remain constant throughout the time period of the analysis.   
Id. at 309. 
 156. Lisa W. Foderaro, New Jersey Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal Landscape, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-
system.html. 
 157. See generally APPR Vision and Mission, APPR, https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020). 
 158. Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions, N.J. CTS. 1, 1–4 (Dec. 2018) 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?cacheID=jkRmwcV. 
 159. Id.  
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overcome—at a hearing—a rebuttable presumption of release by a showing 
of clear and convincing evidence that detention is warranted.160 
These changes brought with them significant reductions in New Jersey’s 
pretrial population, leading the state to incarcerate 6,000 fewer people pretrial 
in 2018 as compared to 2012.161  That is a noteworthy and commendable 
reduction.  Yet racial disparities in bail decisions persist.162  According to a 
2018 report conducted by New Jersey’s Administrative Office of the Courts, 
Black males continue to be overrepresented in the pretrial incarceration 
populations, despite the extensive pretrial reforms—and reductions in pretrial 
incarceration—initiated by the state’s overhaul of its criminal legal system.163  
Thus, while the number of Black women who are incarcerated pretrial fell 
from 44% to 34% from 2012 to 2018, Black men still comprise more than 
50% of the state’s incarcerated population.164  And it failed to rectify racial 
disparities in pretrial detention generally.165 
The PSA undoubtedly played some role in the reduction of the pretrial 
population; the presence of simultaneous, significant reforms makes it 
impossible to measure just how much of a role the PSA played.  That is 
because the PSA is often adopted in conjunction with a host of other pretrial 
reforms, obscuring what has produced results.166 
Since the tools have been implemented and expanded rapidly over a 
short period of time, little data is available to determine their efficacy or 
fairness.167  However, even if these data points were readily accessible, 
 
 160. ACLU of N.J. et al., The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual, NAT’L ASSOC. CRIM. DEF. 
LAWS. 1, 23–30 (Dec. 2016), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/50e0c53b-6641-4a79-8b49-
c733def39e37/the-new-jersey-pretrial-justice-manual.pdf. 
 161. Roman Gressier, Racial Disparities in NJ Bail Persist Despite Reforms: Report, CRIME 
REP. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/04/04/racial-disparities-in-nj-bail-persist-
despite-reforms-report/. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Glenn A. Grant, Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. CTS. 1, 8 (Apr. 2019), 
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=taP. 
 164. See Gressier, supra note 161; Joe Hernandez, N.J. Officials Finally Release Data on Bail 
Reform. Their Conclusion? It’s Working., WHYY (Apr. 2, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/n-j-
officials-have-finally-released-data-on-bail-reform-their-conclusion-its-working. Glenn A. Grant, 
Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. CTS. 1, 21 (2019), 
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrannualreport2019.pdf?c=NF1 (noting that 55% of the 
New Jersey jail population is Black and that the “demographic distribution of male inmates is similar 
to the total population”). 
 165. Gressier, supra note 161.  
 166. See SOUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at 9 (highlighting remarks from Kristin Bechtel at the 
Arnold Foundation, which launched the PSA, explaining that the tool “was just one element of a 
package of changes”); see also The Impact, MOVEMENT ALL. PROJECT (last visited June 1, 2021), 
https://pretrialrisk.com/the-impact/ (describing the limited impact of pretrial risk assessments). 
 167. Buskey & Wood, supra note 145 (highlighting a lack of validation studies and problems 
with existing validation effort). 
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pretrial risk assessments—like all actuarial criminal legal system tools—
raise a more fundamental concern about decision-making in the criminal 
legal system.  The individual who often matters most after the accused is the 
person deciding their fate.  These tools tend to ignore that decisionmaker.  
3. Critique: Looking in All the Wrong Places 
The desire to reduce the pretrial detention population and to address 
unwarranted racial disparities are the oft-stated motivations that animate the 
introduction and use of algorithmic tools in pretrial decision-making.168  
These goals are commendable.  The thinking behind them finds root in 
optimism: If judges could just choose the right people to detain or set free, 
we would have a fairer, less biased system.169  It is also logical.  Ultimately, 
judges are the ones who make the decisions that lead to a robust, racially 
disparate, predominately poor pretrial population.  Unfortunately, there is 
little evidence to suggest that algorithmic tools, alone and as currently 
constructed, can meet the laudable goals and optimism that often drives their 
use.170  Critiques abound explaining why and how the tools fall short from a 
practical and civil rights perspective.171 
 
 168. DESMARAIS & LOWDER, supra note 8; Sarah Picard et al., Beyond the Algorithm: Pretrial 
Reform, Risk Assessment, and Racial Fairness, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 1, 3–4 (2019), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Beyond_The_Algorith
m.pdf; Nuefeld, supra note 12.   
 169. Sarah Brayne & Angele Christin, Technologies of Crime Prediction: The Reception of 
Algorithms in Policing and Criminal Courts, SOC. PROBS., Mar. 2020, at 1, 3, 13; Nuefeld, supra 
note 12; Bail Reform, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://www.arnoldventures.org/work/release-decision-
making/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 170. See Hill, supra note 27 (analyzing the risks of algorithmic tools for racial justice); see also 
Ethan Corey, New Data Suggests Risk Assessment Tools Have Little Impact on Pretrial 
Incarceration, APPEAL (Feb. 7, 2020), https://theappeal.org/new-data-suggests-risk-assessment-
tools-have-little-impact-on-pretrial-incarceration (describing failures across jurisdictions); Henry, 
supra note 152 (analyzing the pitfalls of risk assessment tools and why organizers oppose using 
them). 
 171. For example, twenty-seven researchers, scholars, and advocates signed an open statement 
of concern—submitted to California and Missouri—regarding the use of actuarial risk assessment 
as a means of lowering pretrial jail populations.  Chelsea Barbaras et al., Technical Flaws of Pretrial 
Risk Assessments Raise Grave Concerns, MIT MEDIA LAB (July 17, 2019),  
https://damprod.media.mit.edu/x/2019/07/16/TechnicalFlawsOfPretrial_ML%20site.pdf; see also 
Koepke & Robinson, supra note 30, at 1750; Mayson, supra note 24, at 2227–51 (describing the 
equality tradeoffs of algorithmic risk assessment instruments).  See Robinson & Koepke, supra note 
153, at 3–9 (describing the civil rights concerns raised by algorithmic pretrial risk assessments 
tools); THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USE OF PRETRIAL 
“RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (2018), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf (describing civil 
rights concerns raised by algorithmic risk assessments); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-
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One rarely explored reason is that the tools themselves do little to shape 
or change the behavior of the actors who are ultimately making decisions in 
ways that would reduce pretrial detention or confront racism in the criminal 
legal system.  That is because the tools are aimed at the accused rather than 
the people making decisions about them.  They are designed to forecast what 
those individuals might do in light of their prior history as constructed by the 
world around them and unique characteristics.172  Further, the instrument 
correlates those factors to what others have done in the past.  The focus is 
entirely on the individual before the court.  Wholly absent from the frame is 
what decisionmakers in the system have or have not done in the past when 
faced with a particular decision point, set of facts, or series of allegations.173  
In other words, there are no risk assessment instruments in use that purport 
to measure the decision-making of actors within the system by examining the 
behavior of those actors.  
In part, that is because our own biases about systemic reform and the 
limits of politics and the law have stifled our imagination around points of 
potential intervention, particularly when it comes to pretrial justice.  We 
understand that racial disparity exists.  We concede that our jails hold a 
racially disparate share of poor people and people of color in pretrial 
detention.174  We also presume that if we provide judges enough data about 
those individuals, they will make fairer, racially just decisions.  
Yet that framing ignores a key measure of disparity: the actual behavior 
of actors in the system.  Research has demonstrated that implicit and explicit 
bias plays a significant role in decision-making throughout the criminal legal 
system, and in particular in bail determinations.175  Judges, like anyone else, 
are subject to biases that shape their decisions.176  The fact that people of 
color are treated worse than their white counterparts at every stage of the 
criminal legal system is not solely a reflection of the behavior of those 
individuals or indicative of the things they are accused of having done.  
Rather, that disparity in treatment flows from the biased judgments of 
 
in-criminal-sentencing (describing how an algorithmic risk assessment erroneously overestimated 
the risk posed by Black people while underestimating the risk posed by their white counterparts).  
 172. See Henry, supra note 152 (describing how risk assessment algorithms predict outcomes). 
 173. See Desmarais & Lowder, supra note 8 (describing the descriptive factors used most 
commonly by algorithmic tools, which do not include information about the decisionmaker). 
 174. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/factsheets/pie2019_allimages.pdf.  
 175. Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities In Bail Determinations, 
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 939–44 (2013). 
 176. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1148, 1150–
52 (2013) (describing the influence of implicit bias on criminal justice decision-making); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinksi et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1195, 1208 (2009) (same). 
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powerful system actors about who poses a danger and who does not, who will 
likely return and who will not.  Thus, even if tools were able to precisely 
forecast what an individual may do while awaiting disposition of their case, 
there is no way to ensure that the same biases that shape decision-making 
now would disappear altogether or cease to play an outsized role in decision-
making regardless of the forecast.  
Indeed, one study of the adoption and implementation of algorithmic 
tools in the criminal legal system documented professional resistance by 
judges and prosecutors to the adoption of tools.177  The study also found that, 
far from correcting the biased exercise of discretion, “predictive algorithms 
in fact displace[] discretion to less visible parts” of the criminal legal system, 
such that “legal professionals manipulate the data at their disposal to regain 
the autonomy that they feel is being threatened by the adoption of . . . [new] 
technologies.”178  Shifts in discretion just lead to “new increases in 
discriminatory behaviors.”179 
Pretrial risk assessments currently in use track the concerns relevant to 
statutes governing pretrial release—one’s risk of flight or the potential that 
an individual might be rearrested.180  Being tethered to statutory 
considerations at the expense of any other inquiries limits their overall utility.  
They do not forecast the risk of being wrongfully detained or having bail set 
too high by a particular judge.  They do not tell us whether a prosecutor’s 
office unjustly but consistently seeks detention or bail for those they charge 
with crimes.  Nor have they been used to provide any real insights about 
judicial behavior.  In a regime grounded on evidence-based practices, there 
is little—if any—inquiry about the evidence that judges (or other criminal 
legal system actors) are behaving in unbiased ways or imposing pretrial 
conditions that comport with justice. 
Given what we know, the consequences of ignoring the behavior of 
system actors are significant.  First, it ensures that we will continue to focus 
 
 177. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 7–10; see also Stevenson, supra note 21, at 341–69 
(evaluating how Kentucky judges used risk assessment instruments). 
 178. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 13.  
 179. Id. at 14. 
 180. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 30, at 1752–54.  Those concerns include things like one’s 
ties to a community because of stable employment, a steady address, a history of failures to appear 
in court, prior criminal history, the nature and character of prior criminal convictions, pending or 
current charges, age, and marital status.  Sarah L. Desmarais, et al., Predictive Validity of Pretrial 
Risk Instruments: A Systematic Review of the Literature, J. CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. (on file with 
author); see also Community Justice Exchange, an Organizer’s Guide to Confronting Pretrial Risk 
Assessment Tools in Decarceration Campaigns, CMTY. JUST. EXCH. 36–41 (Dec. 2019), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ba95e4c51f4d408d6784c85/t/5defce44bdfdf024df3b87f8/1
575997003585/CJE_PretrialRATGuide_FinalDec2019Version.pdf (detailing variables commonly 
considered by algorithmic risk assessments). 
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on those being consumed by the system while failing to scrutinize the system 
and those who make the decisions that produce harm and burden the accused.  
Second, a system that fails to engage in critical self-evaluation and corrective 
behavior undermines any faith that we can put in reform efforts.  We rightly 
expect those convicted of crimes to reflect on their behavior and change it for 
the better.  Our failure to expect the same of system actors undermines the 
integrity of the system itself. 
D. Algorithmic Tools and Sentencing   
1. Theory 
Over the last two decades, jurisdictions nationwide have adopted 
algorithmic risk assessment tools to guide sentencing decisions.181  The shift 
to the use of these tools to assist sentencing decisions finds root in a larger 
movement of to engage in evidence-based practices to make the criminal 
legal system “smart, rather than tough, on crime.”182  Criminal legal systems 
have embraced these tools largely on the hope that they can distinguish 
between people who pose a high or low risk of reoffending with greater 
precision and, in turn, foster a more efficient and effective allocation of 
limited sentencing resources.183  
These tools first emerged in the 1920s as guides to assist parole 
decision-making.184  Correctional authorities used them to shape the 
administration of punishment and to help identify the correctional 
interventions one should receive if incarcerated or under some form of 
supervision.185  University of Chicago Professor Ernest Burgess was among 
the first to develop a risk assessment instrument, designed to predict an 
individual’s likelihood of success on parole based on an examination of 
 
 181. Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1490, 
1514 (2018) (noting that “an increasing number of states use risk-based instruments to inform 
decisionmaking at sentencing” and that the use of these tools has been countenanced and encouraged 
by state supreme courts and statutes.); Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 63 (2018) 
(recounting the growth in use of algorithmic tools at sentencing)   
 182. Collins, supra note 181; see also Barkow, supra note 10, at 1619 (describing the sentencing 
guidelines regime as arising out of “dissatisfaction with discretionary and indeterminate sentencing 
regimes that focused too much on individualization and not enough on avoiding unjust disparities”). 
 183. Dawinder Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 673 (2015). 
 184. Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal 
Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513 (2013). 
 185. Collins, supra note 181, at 79–80. 
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twenty-one factors.186  A competing tool, developed by criminologists at 
Harvard Law School, narrowed the number of predictive factors to seven.187  
Despite their label, sentencing risk assessments were not intended to 
determine sentence length.188  Instead, they generally were:  
[C]reated to guide decisions about how to administer punishment, 
not about how much punishment is due.  In fact, the social 
scientists who developed the tools that are being incorporated into 
sentencing decisions expressly disavow their use to “assist in 
establishing the just penalty,” specifically in decisions about 
whether to incarcerate and the length of the sentence.189   
Nevertheless, they inform a judge’s decision about the length of a 
person’s sentence; they also shape judgments about where an incarceratory 
sentence will be served, whether the sentence will include supervision, or 
some form of diversion.190 
Sentencing risk assessment instruments have become a common feature 
of the presentence investigation.  Presentence authorities—often within the 
organizational confines of the court system—typically administer the 
instrument during a presentence investigation and provide the results to the 
court, defense counsel, the prosecution, and the person facing judgment as a 
data point to be considered when fashioning an appropriate sentence.  These 
instruments generally seek to forecast one future outcome.  They look to 
quantify the risk that someone will reoffend in some way that undermines 
public safety.191  This consideration of future dangerousness and public safety 
risk at sentencing has been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court and has 
become essential to criminal sentencing.192  
The development of sentencing risk assessment instruments follows a 
familiar process.  Constructing an algorithmic tool of this sort requires first 
collecting “data on people charged or convicted of crimes in the past as a 
base population.”193  Data sources vary, but generally draw from observations 
of those released from prison or those referred to probation or some other 
 
 186. Harcourt, supra note 30, at 58; see also Berk & Bleich, supra note 184, at 513 (citing 
Professor Burgess’s study as one example of predictive tools dating back to the 1920s).  
 187. Harcourt, supra note 30, at 61.  The criminologists, professor Sheldon Gleuck and research 
assistant Eleanor Gleuck, arrived at seven factors to refine their tool to a narrow set of factors, and 
in turn, fewer predictive variables, guided by their research and data collection.  Id. at 60–62.   
 188. Collins, supra note 181, at 61. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 67–71. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Garrett, supra note 181, at 1513–14. 
 193. Jessica Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 73 (2017). 
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form of supervision.194  It also may come from different geographic locations 
from the venue of the sentencing at issue as well—different regions of a state, 
the United States, and, in some instances, other countries.195  Designers then 
undertake to define recidivism—whether that is an arrest, an arrest plus a 
formal charge, a final adjudication, or some other conduct.196  Tool 
developers then create a statistical model to identify factors that bear a 
statistically significant correlation with recidivism.197  That model is the 
framework for the actuarial risk assessment tool.  
Ultimately, the number of factors varies with each instrument, but, 
generally, they “consider ‘static’ factors that the [person to be sentenced] can 
do nothing about (like prior crimes or age) and ‘dynamic’ risk factors that 
[may change over time] (like substance abuse or impulsivity).”198  Most 
include consideration of four categories of factors: (1) criminal history, (2) 
antisocial attitude, (3) demographics, and (4) socio-economic status.199  Like 
pretrial risk assessments, sentencing risk assessments produce a numerical 
score by evaluating whether an individual possesses certain risk factors—
such as criminal history, socio-economic status, mental health status and 
history, marital status, and a range of demographic features.200  That 
information may be collected through a structured interview with the person 
to be assessed, by way of a questionnaire to be completed voluntarily by the 
person to be sentenced, or, in some instances, through publicly accessible 
data about the individual.201  The score is associated with a category of 
recidivism risk—usually low, medium, or high.202 
The character, nature, and accuracy of the prediction varies with the 
algorithmic tools used.203  So too does the level of transparency of the factors 
considered by the tool and the weight given to them.204  Thus, there is no 
standard level of offense or type of recidivism that these tools measure—
serious violence or minor criminal behavior may be among the predictive 
 
 194. Id. at 74. 
 195. Id. at 74–75. 
 196. Id. at 75–76. 
 197. Id. at 78–79. 
 198. .Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 584–86 (2018). 
 199. Eaglin, supra note 193, at 83. 
 200. See Slobogin, supra note 198, at 584–86 (describing three statistically driven risk 
assessment instruments that are representative of sentencing risk assessments).  Tool designers 
determine “which predictive factors observed in the statistical model” used to construct the 
algorithmic tool will ultimately be included in the tool.  Eaglin, supra note 193 at 81–88.  
 201. Eaglin, supra note 193, at 85. 
 202. Eaglin, ’supra note 31, at 92. 
 203. Slobogin, supra note 198, at 587–92. 
 204. Garrett, supra note 181, at 1515. 
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outputs.205  Nor is there a standard temporal limit on when reoffense may 
occur.206  Some tools address risk management—what is needed to prevent 
recidivism—while others only produce a recidivism risk forecast.207  
Notwithstanding the fact that “predicting more serious offenses is more 
challenging than predicting low-risk offenders,”208 proponents of algorithmic 
tools at sentencing posit that they regularly outperform human judgments 
alone.209  Proponents also claim that the tools will “increase public safety by 
reducing recidivism. . . . increase[] the accuracy of decisions judges are 
already making. . . . [and benefit] the public, who save money while avoiding 
future victimization” and people convicted of crimes who avoid 
incarceration.210  A look at the tools in practice tells a different story.  
2. Practice  
As with algorithmic tools in policing and the pretrial system,211 
algorithmic sentencing tools have not fully delivered the desired results of 
less biased sentencing or reductions in recidivism.212  Indeed, a recent 
empirical study of Virginia’s use of algorithmic tools at sentencing provides 
insights about the wide gulf between the theoretical promise these 
 
 205. Slobogin, supra note 198, at 587; see also Collins, supra note 181, at 64–65, 107 
(explaining that tools vary in the type of recidivism they predict—from rearrest to conviction, to 
reconviction for any offense, including a misdemeanor, felony, or violation of court-imposed 
supervision).  
 206. Slobogin, supra note 198, at 587–88. 
 207. Id. at 588. 
 208. Garrett, supra note 181, at 1515. 
 209. Id. at 1514; see also John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting 
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 408 (2006) (explaining that 
“[t]he general superiority of actuarial over clinical risk assessment in the behavioral sciences has 
been known for half a century”).  The debate on accuracy of the tools is not over.  A 2018 Dartmouth 
College study found that people responding to an online survey were able to predict risk about as 
well as the COMPAS risk assessment.  Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and 
Limits of Predicting Recidivism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1, 3; Collins, supra note 181, at 
95.   
 210. Collins, supra note 181, at 72.  
 211. See Huq, supra note 11, at 1074–85 (describing the widespread use of algorithmic and 
actuarial tools in sentencing and noting that it is “‘improbable’ that that any convicted felon, whether 
an adult or juvenile, would be sentenced today without the aid of some sort of actuarial risk 
instrument, albeit not necessarily one that employs algorithmic means.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 212. See id. at 1049, 1052 (explaining that actuarial sentencing fosters incarceration and 
incapacitation, undermining efforts to curb recidivism through rehabilitation and the provision of 
services; that even the best instruments are wrong at least 30% of the time; and that fiscal savings 
are difficult to calculate and often outweighed by the human costs of inaccurate predictions and 
unnecessary incarceration); Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806, 842 (2014) (noting that actuarial risk 
assessment does not provide anything close to a precise prediction of individual risks).   
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instruments hold and the way they operate in practice.213  Critically, the study 
marks “the first evaluation of how risk assessment at sentencing affects 
outcomes relative to the status quo.”214  As relevant here, one of the Virginia 
tools studied was used in conjunction with sentencing guidelines to divert 
low-risk people convicted of nonviolent offenses from jail or prison.215 
The results of the study encapsulate the difficulties algorithmic tools 
face in meeting the promise their proponents believe they hold.  In short, 
“Virginia’s nonviolent risk assessment reduced neither incarceration nor 
recidivism; its use disadvantaged a vulnerable group (the young); and failed 
to reduce racial disparities.”216 
Although sentences for those with high risk scores increased and those 
with low risk scores decreased, there was scant evidence that the tool yielded 
a reduction in recidivism.217  The instrument suggested that judges should 
have imposed lengthier sentences on young people than were actually being 
imposed on youth,218 meaning that if judges followed the tool’s 
recommendations, there would have been an increase in sentences for young 
people.  Nevertheless, the tool did lead to a slightly greater chance of 
incarceration for young people and an increase in sentence length for 
youth.219  
Racial disparities in sentencing were largely unchanged by the tool, 
though Black people scored substantially higher—and therefore riskier—
than their white counterparts.220  Racial disparities grew in courts where the 
tool was viewed as the most influential, largely due to the tendency of judges 
to exercise more leniency for white people with high risk scores than for 
Black people with high risk scores.221 
This study also shed light on the role of discretion by judges when given 
an algorithmic tool.  Among the findings were that judges were three 
percentage points less likely to divert Black people in the highest risk 
 
 213. Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of 
Humans 1, 5  (Nov. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489440. 
 214. Id. at 5. 
 215. Id. at 2. 
 216. Id. at 5.  The study’s authors provide a number of possible explanations for this set of 
results.  Among those explanations are the exercise of discretion by sentencing judges whose 
decisions are shaped by a host of factors; judges gaining familiarity with the forecasts that a risk 
instrument produces; the willingness of a judge to consult an algorithmic tool; and the way judges 
make use of the information conveyed by the algorithmic tool.  Id. at 22–29 
 217. Id. at 2. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at 3. 
 220. Id. at 2. 
 221. Id.  
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category out of the formal system than white people in the same category.222  
Judges also chose whether to follow or deviate from the algorithmic tool 
when factors like race, gender, or socioeconomic status were at play—factors 
that shaped the judge’s view of the person before the court and the 
circumstances that led them into the criminal legal system.223  Judicial 
discretion actually minimized the significant increase in the chances of 
incarceration for a young person that would have resulted from a faithful 
adherence to the instrument’s forecast.224  At the same time, judges who used 
the algorithmic tools the most were also more likely to be more lenient to 
white people with high risk scores than they were with Black people who 
similarly scored high risk.225 
These real-world consequences highlight the challenges that come with 
the development and implementation of algorithmic tools.  They also 
underscore the very real difficulty of forecasting an individual’s future based 
on what we know about other individuals.  More to the point, they underscore 
the shortcomings of profiling. 
3. Critique: Racial Profiling 2.0? 
By nature, algorithmic tools produce their risk scores by analyzing 
group-level data that correlates with certain types of behavior of interest to a 
decisionmaker.226  The tools then assign a score that approximates the 
relationship between the characteristics possessed by the group and the 
behavior engaged in by members of the group.227  The similarity between the 
individual being assessed and the group from which the data is drawn 
produces a forecast of what an individual may do.  In other words, the tools 
“ascribe a blanket risk profile to all individuals in a group,” recommending 
treatment based on an individual’s association with a group.228  Thus, the 
tools rank people convicted of crimes “according to likelihood of engaging 
in criminal behavior based on the behavior of the individuals in the 
 
 222. Id. at 25. 
 223. Id. at 26. 
 224. Id. at 27. 
 225. Id. at 29.  Another study of Virginia’s Nonviolent Risk Assessment (“NVRA”) revealed an 
additional concern.  The tool was developed with the stated goal of identifying people convicted of 
nonviolent crimes at the lowest risk of recidivism for diversion from prison.  Brandon Garrett & 
John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, 103 JUDICATURE, 
SUMMER 2019, at 42, 45 (2019).  A review of sentencing data from 2016 concerning the use of the 
NVRA by judges in diversion decisions revealed that “many—indeed, most—defendants eligible 
for [ ] alternative sentences did not receive them.”  Id.  
 226. See Nicholas, supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 227. See Eaglin, supra note 193, at 85–88 (describing how sentencing algorithmic tools are 
designed and constructed). 
 228. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 702.  
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underlying data set.”229  In that sense, actuarial risk assessments operate as a 
form of digital profiling, prescribing the treatment of an individual based on 
their similarity to, or membership in, a group.  Forecasts based on actuarial 
data provide us with insights about groups of people but reveal far less about 
individuals.230  When it comes to sentencing, the tools become a way of 
asking whether the person before the court is more, less, or equally dangerous 
as a group of people based solely on the statistical similarities between the 
group and the individual.231 
Such an approach is troubling, to say the least.  Treating someone in a 
specific way because they share the characteristics of a group is the essence 
of profiling.232  Such conduct offends an axiomatic principle that cuts across 
the criminal legal system and bears particular significance at sentencing: 
individuals should be treated as individuals, not based on their membership 
in, or shared characteristics with, a particular group.233  Put differently, “our 
criminal law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”234  That 
edict carries even more weight when one considers the fact that sentencing 
risk assessments, by potentially suggesting a lengthier term of incarceration 
based on a rough forecast that one may recidivate, are in essence punishing 
individuals not only for crimes they have not yet committed but for anything 
they may ever do at any point in the future.  
Since actuarial sentencing takes root in the toxic soil of profiling and 
encourages the analysis of characteristics that correlate with recidivism, it 
necessarily drives judges to consider factors that may have nothing to do with 
culpability.235  Actuarial risk assessments not only “incorporate a range of 
non-culpable characteristics into their calculations, most of [them] 
 
 229. Eaglin, supra note 193, at 85. 
 230. Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual Criminals: An Ethical and 
Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 
714 (2007) (explaining that “[s]tatistical predictions speak to group tendencies, not individual 
proclivities”) 
 231. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 675. 
 232. Profiling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The practice or an instance of 
using particular information about someone or something to infer other probable characteristic.”). 
 233. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 702–03 (explaining that punishment is to be inflicted because of 
one’s conduct, not group membership).  The Supreme Court surfaced this concern in Batson v. 
Kentucky, which set forth a framework to address racial discrimination in jury selection.  476 U.S. 
79 (1986).  The Court explained that its concern rested on the notion that prosecutors were making 
decisions about who to strike from juries based on their race and alleged resultant affinity for a 
particular group, rather than on an individualized consideration of their fitness as a juror.  Id. at 87–
88.  
 234. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 766 (2017). 
 235. Collins, supra note 181, at 103–04; see also Eaglin, supra note 31, at 99 (explaining that 
predictive analytics weighs factors that fall outside an individual’s control, exposing “[t]ensions 
regarding what counts at sentencing and the meaning of fairness.”). 
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omit . . . the crime for which the [convicted person] is being punished.”236  
Thus, the risk assessment suggests a punishment that does not reflect a 
consideration of the crime of conviction, but instead relies on factors such as 
one’s gender, education, employment history, and mental health status.237  
This raises yet another profiling-related concern.  It is not hard to 
imagine a host of other factors that are deemed relevant to sentencing through 
the lens of an actuarial risk assessment because they are correlated with 
recidivism.238  Such factors may also be associated with distinct 
disadvantages faced by communities of color.239  For example, imagine a 
sentencing risk assessment that considers one’s zip code, level of education, 
marital status, familial ties, and parental criminality.  Given the way 
structural inequality influences life outcomes along racial lines, all of these 
factors unfairly disadvantage Black people facing sentencing.240  
That is problematic for at least two reasons.  First, it perpetuates racially 
disparate treatment at sentencing.  People with what are considered negative 
characteristics will be viewed as recidivism risks and will therefore warrant 
harsher treatment.  If those people happen to be Black, racially disparate 
treatment will be the result.  Second, it forces those who rely on risk 
assessment to equate correlation with causation.  In doing so, decisionmakers 
must forgo consideration of context and nuance—the reasons why the 
individual before the court may be different from all those who previously 
appeared for sentencing.  The result is a sentencing regime that either 
punishes a person or dispenses mercy based on who they are in comparison 
to others, rather than what brought the individual before the court, what they 
did, and who they might become in the future with or without the intervention 
of a criminal sanction.241  
 
 236. Collins, supra note 181, at 103.  One example of incorporating nonculpable characteristics 
is the consideration of marital status as it relates to recidivism.  Marital status may connote less time 
spent outside of the house, which is the true predictor of recidivism.  If an instrument only considers 
marital status, but does not consider time outside of the home, the use of the correlated variable 
(marital status) in the instrument instead of the true variable (time outside the house), means that 
those single people who do not spend time outside the house will be scored riskier because they are 
not married, even though as an individual, they may be less risky.  Netter, supra note 230, at 715. 
 237. Collins, supra note 181, at 104–05.  This is a variation on the flawed data as destiny, 
garbage in, garbage out critique detailed.  See supra Section I.B.3. 
 238. Sidhu, supra note 183, at 702.  
 239. Eaglin, supra note 31, at 95–97. 
 240. Id. at 96–97. 
 241. Collins, supra note 181, at 107 (noting that those who benefit from actuarial sentencing 
benefit because of “‘’ their “relative privilege”  in the form of “access to educational and 
employment opportunities, [and] a low-crime zip code. . . .”); see also Sidhu, supra note 183, at 
707–10 (explaining that risk assessments “demand punishment for a group identity over which the 
individual has no meaningful control”). 
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To be sure, actors throughout the criminal legal system use anecdotal, 
qualitative, or quantitative data about groups to make judgments about 
individuals.  The routine nature of the practice does not make it less troubling.  
Saddling judgments about individuals with the behaviors and actions of 
others who may be similarly situated by age at first arrest, marital status, 
employment status, or their prior involvement with the criminal legal system 
raises concerns about equity and justice that are unique when one’s freedom 
is on the line.242  Most would agree that a just criminal legal system requires 
those sitting in judgment of the accused to undertake a holistic consideration 
of the person before them, weighing factors for which an algorithm may not 
account.243  Judging people based on their associations with data points flies 
in the face of the notion of an individualized evaluation of the person standing 
before the court. 
The problem with profiling is highlighted both by the robust debate over 
the differing measures of fairness of algorithmic risk assessment instruments 
and the impact that such judgments can have on individuals.  In 2016, the 
news organization ProPublica investigated the accuracy of risk assessment 
scores used in pretrial decision-making in Broward County, Florida.244  They 
examined the risk scores of more than 7,000 Broward County arrestees from 
2013 and 2014 to evaluate how many arrested people would be charged with 
new crimes over the next two years.245  What their investigation uncovered 
was nothing short of breathtaking.  Unreliable forecasts of violent crime were 
the instrument’s hallmark: only 20% of those predicted to commit violent 
crimes went on to do so.246  The faulty forecasts not only carried serious racial 
disparities but also inaccurate predictions of who posed a risk of future 
criminality.  Black people were falsely labeled as future criminals at nearly 
twice the rate of their white counterparts, while white people were mislabeled 
as low risk more often than their Black counterparts.247  
ProPublica foreclosed the possibility that these disparities could result 
from prior criminal history, age, and gender.  Even after controlling for those 
variables, “Black defendants were still 77% more likely to be pegged as at 
 
 242. Netter, supra note 230, at 714. 
 243. See Caryn Devins et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 396 
(2017) (explaining that just sentencing requires judicial discretion to “consider the individual 
holistically, to weigh the competing purposes of sentencing, and to consider factors not accounted 
for by the Guidelines.  In other words, the “frame” of sentencing determinations is fluid and requires 
case-by-case evaluations.  The variables that were important in one sentencing proceeding may be 
less influential in another.  These types of discretionary determinations are inherently not reducible 
to rigid criteria or models.”). 
 244. Angwin et al., supra note 156. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. 
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higher risk of committing a future violent crime and 45% more likely to be 
predicted to commit a future crime of any kind.”248   
Northpointe, the company responsible for the risk assessment 
instrument that produced those scores, rejected ProPublica’s analysis.249  In 
doing so, Northpointe argued that the tools they constructed were racially 
neutral because Black and white people who were labeled high risk were 
rearrested at the same rates.250  Thus, Northpointe claimed, the tool accurately 
sorted individuals without regard to race.251  
The debate between ProPublica and Northpointe252 raises a point about 
measuring fairness and equity that illuminates the profiling concern.253  Each 
entity is examining notions of fairness and equality through a different set of 
lenses.  For ProPublica’s part, the measure of fairness that matters most is 
error rate balance.  Under that rubric, the fairness of the tool depends on 
preventing any single group or individual from bearing the burden of the 
mistakes made by the risk assessment instrument.254  From Northpointe’s 
perspective, the fact that when an individual is labeled high risk, they are 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and 
Predictive Parity, NORTHPOINTE RESEARCH DEPT. 1, 2 (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391-ProPublica-Commentary-Final-
070616.html. 
 250. Id. at 2–3.  
 251. Id. at 11–13; Eaglin, supra note 193, at 97. 
 252. See, e.g., Laurel Eckhouse et al., Layers of Bias: A Unified Approach for Understanding 
Problems with Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV., 185, 190–93 (2019) (detailing 
ProPublica and Northpointe’s positions on the COMPAS tool); Emily Berman, A Government of 
Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1277, 1328 (2018) (same); Eaglin, supra note 193, at 
96–97 (same); Anne L. Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS-
ProPublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131, 148-151 (2018) (same). 
 253. For an interactive exercise that demonstrates the challenges presented by the fairness 
tradeoffs at the heart of this debate, see Karen Hao & Jonathan Stray, Can You Make AI Fairer Than 
a Judge? Play Our Courtroom Algorithm Game, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613508/ai-fairer-than-judge-criminal-risk-assessment-
algorithm/.  Research has revealed that it is mathematically impossible to simultaneously meet both 
definitions of fairness in the ProPublica and Northpointe debate when the input data that captures 
the behavior of different groups differs.  See Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with 
Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153 (2017) 
(“[A]n instrument that satisfies predictive parity cannot have equal false positive and negative rates 
across groups when the recidivism prevalence differs across those groups.”); Jon Kleinberg et al., 
Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 2017 PROC. INNOVATIONS 
THEORETICAL COMP. SCI. 1, 17 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf (describing the 
tradeoffs of measures of fairness). 
 254. In this way, the ProPublica measure most clearly reflects the concern that may arise when 
someone is profiled—that they suffer because of what others have done in the past. 
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rearrested at the same rates as others who share that label—predictive 
parity—is indicative of the tool’s accuracy.255  
One measure is concerned with mislabeling individuals; the other is 
concerned that all those who are labeled alike are treated alike.  But both 
measures still look at the behavior of unrelated groups to determine how 
individuals should be treated: they “evaluate[ ] [a person’s] risk using data 
about other people.”256  That is, no matter how you measure it, the very 
essence of profiling.257  
Profiling has consequences.  Among the most disturbing is the “ratchet 
effect.”258  This concept describes a type of feedback loop that produces 
disparities between groups who come into contact with the criminal legal 
system repeatedly over time.  It is what happens when, for example, police 
focus law enforcement resources on people who match the profile of those 
who are incarcerated for a particular criminal activity rather than on those 
who are actually engaged in that criminal activity.  The ratchet effect comes 
into play because those who match the profile are subject to greater law 
enforcement attention and scrutiny.  That attention leads to more arrests of 
the profiled group—a type of self-fulfilling prophecy that encourages further 
profiling and law enforcement focus on those who match the profile.  
Meanwhile, those who do not match the profile, but are still engaged in 
criminal activity, do not receive the same level of law enforcement attention, 
if they receive any at all.  Ultimately, the ratchet effect creates the false 
impression that the only people who commit crimes are those who match a 
profile.259  Much like the potential feedback loop forged by predictive 
policing, actuarial tools at sentencing encourage us to continue incarcerating 
the same populations repeatedly which, in turn, fosters the inequity that feeds 
mass incarceration and criminalization.  
Thus, by profiling members of the group who are most likely to be 
rearrested—those deemed high risk who may be “unattached, unemployed, 
or unskilled”—the system ensures that those individuals are more likely to 
be jailed, exacerbating the very risk those individuals allegedly pose by 
placing one more barrier—a term of incarceration—in their way.260  In light 
 
 255. In other words, “[f]airness could be defined as treating everyone the same or it could be 
defined as giving everyone similar outcomes.”  Washington, supra note 252, at 150.  Accordingly, 
“[t]he central complication is that there is no single measure of racial equality in risk assessment.  
Instead, there are many possible measures and, in most circumstances, it is impossible to achieve 
racial equality according to every measure at once.”  Mayson, supra note 24, at 2233. 
 256. Eckhouse, et al., supra note 252, at 198. 
 257. See supra note 232 
 258. Harcourt, supra note 30, at 220 (emphasis omitted).  
 259. Id. at 3. 
 260. Id. at 220. 
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of the foregoing, it is not hard to see that deep, troubling problems flow from 
the profiling problem of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing. 
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
To this point, I have grappled with the history, design, and 
implementation of algorithmic tools at three distinct decision points in the 
criminal legal system—policing, bail, and sentencing.  In doing so, I have 
catalogued the types of problems that accompany the use of those tools.  They 
rest on data infected by racial bias, and therefore produce forecasts that reflect 
that bias.  They are aimed at the people already targeted by the criminal legal 
system rather than the system or its decisionmakers.  And they encourage 
profiling by recommending a criminal legal system response based on a 
person’s association with a group.   
Solutions to these problems do not come easy.  The most 
straightforward would be ending the use of algorithmic tools in the criminal 
legal system altogether.  At first glance, that is a simple fix.  However, given 
the widespread nature of algorithmic tools,261 it is unlikely to happen any time 
in the near future.  Even if abolition of the tools merits consideration as an 
ultimate goal, that road will be paved with paradigmatic shifts in the way 
systems operate.  The rapid development and expansion of algorithmic tools 
can be viewed as providing opportunities to shape those shifts of the system 
and implement potential solutions.  A blunt end to the use of algorithmic tools 
also fails to account for the nuance and complexity of the problems they 
present.  All tools—and all stages of the system—are not equal.  Nor do they 
distribute their harms evenly.  In keeping with that view, what follows is an 
exploration of the ways that we might mitigate the potential and realized 
harms that flow from the use of algorithmic tools in the criminal legal system, 
with an eye toward abolitionist, transformative ends. 
A. A Framework for Confronting Algorithmic Tools  
A framework to confront the challenges raised by algorithmic tools 
requires that we interrogate the role of race, its relationship to power, and the 
influence of both phenomena on the law.262  If we understand algorithmic 
 
 261. Henry, supra note 152 (“Nearly every U.S. state and the federal system have implemented 
risk assessment in some form.”); Huq, supra note 11, at 1052 (noting that algorithmic tools are 
“likely to soon become pervasive” in the criminal legal system). 
 262. KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., PART FIVE: THE SEARCH FOR AN OPPOSITIONAL 
VOICE, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii 
(Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (noting that goal of critical race theory is “not merely to 
understand the vexed bond between law and racial power but to change it”); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices 
of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 
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tools as instruments that carry the potential to reproduce the racial inequity 
of our criminal legal system, a lens that is rooted in critical race theory and 
which focuses on and scrutinizes the nature of racial inequality seems not 
only appropriate but required.263  A focus on the role of race in shaping the 
law—and by extension the world that the law inhabits, defines, and 
regulates—holds the most promise for a fundamental shift in the way 
algorithmic tools and the American criminal legal system operate.264  
The next Section applies a racial justice lens to the challenges presented 
by algorithmic tools.  It addresses what these tools would look like and how 
they would be deployed if we accepted that racism is a permanent fixture; 
that the exercise of classification parallels the construction of race; that bold 
changes are needed to combat the reform/retrenchment paradigm and the 
tendency of the law to favor the status quo; that the voices of the marginalized 
are the voices that matter; and that we should engage with the nuance and 
complexity that shapes one’s identity.  What follows is a discussion about the 
policy choices that we need to make regarding the balance of power and 
algorithmic tools in a way that confronts the racism and unfairness that 
pervades the criminal legal system.265  
 
YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991) (explaining that critical race theory works “to develop a 
jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law and that works toward the 
elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of subordination”) 
 263. A racial justice lens challenges the dominant bases for American antidiscrimination law—
the notion that colorblindness produces race neutrality and that color consciousness produces racial 
preferences.  Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1609 (2011).  It 
does so by demonstrating how “‘colorblind’ laws often serve to further insider privileges along the 
lines of race, gender, and class, while marginalizing and obscuring social, political, and economic 
inequality.”  I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2019).  In this way, a racial justice lens “embraces color 
consciousness . . . as the way to rectify today’s racist legal legacies.”  Adrien Katherine Wing, Space 
Traders for the Twenty-First Century, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 49, 51 (2009).  These 
contributions speak to racism’s position not as the product of individual biases alone, but as a 
structural and institutional phenomenon.  Carbado, supra note 263, at 1612.  
 264. DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 1 
(2014) (“Critical Race Theory askes the question: ‘what does race have to do with it?’”).  Critical 
race theory has also been described as a discipline that:  
[E]xhumes the atrocities of our historical past and confronts their continuing curse; it 
articulates the ways in which race, gender, and class inequality converge and 
interpenetrate; and it focuses our attention on the problems of structural discrimination, 
unequal treatment, and the incomplete nature of democracy in our social order.   
Michael Omi & Howard Winant, The Unfinished Business of Race, in RACE LAW STORIES ix 
(Rachel F. Moran and Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).  For an overview of critical race theory, see 
Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 
183, 184 (2013); Capers, supra note 264, at 20–30; Adrien K. Wing, Is There a Future for Critical 
Race Theory?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 44, 47–53 (2016). 
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B. Accepting the Truth: The Permanence of Racism  
Racism is a permanent, fixed feature of American society.266  It is 
“constitutive of, rather than oppositional to, American democracy,”267 and 
woven into our nation’s fabric.268  It is “an integral, permanent, and 
indestructible component of this society.”269  This conclusion stems not from 
a sense of hopelessness or an acceptance of the second-class citizenship and 
inequity that racism breeds.  It instead emanates from a deep, reflective, and 
clear-eyed examination of America’s history and current condition.  
Countless scholars have documented, with excruciating detail, the 
defect that marred America’s birth and continues to shape its life: the 
ideology of white supremacy, which defined superiority and inferiority along 
racial lines.270  Indeed, this racist ideology was America’s birthright, baked 
into the country’s DNA.271  It has been with us for at least four centuries.272  
In that time, it has served a number of purposes.  It was used to prop up and 
justify the enslavement of African people in America.273  It delineated 
freedom.  It was the handmaiden to the criminal legal system.  And it is so 
interwoven within the range of institutions that govern American life that its 
presence is ubiquitous today.274  The deep-rooted nature of institutional, 
structural, and interpersonal racism, when weighed against the current pace 
of racial justice-oriented reform, leaves little room for us to hope that we can 
disentangle racism from the American way of life. 
The endemic nature of racism bears the weight of a fundamental truth 
worthy of acceptance.  Yet doing so—actually accepting the deep-seated 
nature of racism—presents challenges for those who seek to deploy 
 
other domains as well where algorithmic tools are used to sort, identify, and produce forecasts about 
people or places and where those tools rely on existing data to do so.  
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 267. Id. at 1613; Wing, supra note 264, at 48  
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algorithmic tools as a means to attack decision-making infected by implicit 
and explicit racism.  One of the more difficult challenges of accepting the 
omnipresence of racism is the natural disappointment that comes with 
realizing that there is no way to eradicate it.  Yet that realization obscures 
what should be the target of our efforts when we seek to employ algorithmic 
tools in the criminal legal system.  Rather than attempting to solve racism, 
acceptance that racism is a permanent, fixed feature forces us to confront and 
take stock of the role that racism plays as we design, implement, and engage 
in oversight of algorithmic tools.  That is true not only in the data upon which 
the tools rely but in the targets at which those tools are leveled, the outputs 
that those tools produce, and the very institution in which the tools are 
deployed.  The policy recommendations in this Section are informed by, and 
flow from, recognition and acceptance of this basic premise, with good 
reason.  Our times demand it, and our reality dictates it.  Not only because 
the ideology of racial supremacy and inferiority has shaped American society 
and its governing institutions, but because the data tells us that the same 
ideology casts an inescapable shadow over policy and practice in the criminal 
legal system today.275 
We cannot hope to change the current state of affairs if we proceed as 
though the status quo is divorced from our history and our reality.  An 
intentional and focused orientation toward that history and a fulsome 
response to what it has produced is necessary.  This is not a radical idea.  It 
is a suggestion that we exchange those values that blind us to our past for 
those which acknowledge that history and work to address it—something 
akin to what we might call a form of digital reparations.276  
 
 275. Balko, supra note 3.  
 276. The contrast between the values that blind us to our history and those that require we 
acknowledge it was most readily illustrated in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 
U.S. 291 (2014).  The majority in Schuette upheld an amendment to Michigan’s constitution that 
barred race conscious admissions policies in higher education.  Id. at 315.  Justice Sotomayor, in 
dissent, explained, “My colleagues are of the view that we should leave race out of the picture 
entirely and let the voters sort it out. . . . We have seen this reasoning before.”  Id. at 380 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  See Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race.”).  It is, unfortunately, a sentiment out of touch with reality, one not required 
by our Constitution, and one that has properly been rejected as ‘not sufficient’ to resolve cases of 
this nature.  Schuette, 572 U.S. at 380 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor further 
remarked: 
This refusal to accept the stark reality that race matters is regrettable.  The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, 
and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of 
racial discrimination. . . . [W]e ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, 
the racial inequality that exists in our society.  It is this view that works harm, by 
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C. The Implications of Acceptance 
Several policy prescriptions emerge when we take seriously the 
implications of the worldview that racial inequality is not a passing 
phenomenon but instead a permanent feature.  They fall into three categories.  
First, there are those that relate to the input data fed into the algorithmic tools 
and adjustments to the forecasts that the tools produce.  That means 
accounting for race in the data on which algorithmic tools rely (the inputs) 
and in the forecasts (the outputs) that they produce.  
Second, there are those that center on the actors who design and use 
algorithmic tools.  In this case, that means requiring actors that seek to use 
algorithmic tools to detect and remedy the real and potential harms of those 
tools.  It also means placing algorithmic tools in the hands of communities so 
that they may deploy them to scrutinize system actors.  
Finally, there are broader policy prescriptions about the criminal legal 
system as a whole that can inform when and whether these instruments are 
useful.  This intervention requires countering the turn to raw numbers with 
attention to the stories of those enmeshed in the criminal legal system, 
privileging qualitative information over quantitative data.  
Ultimately these interventions would serve as a paradigmatic shift in the 
way the current system operates, opening up the potential for a different 
criminal legal system.  I address each policy prescription in turn, beginning 
with changes to input data and the forecasts produced by the tools.  
1. Accounting for Race in the Inputs 
This first category of measures responsive to the permanence of racism 
requires that we develop tools that credibly account for racism and the 
disparities it produces, in the same way factors like prior criminal history, 
employment status, and education are part of the data analyzed by an 
algorithmic tool.  Fully acknowledging the feature-level nature of race in this 
way means orienting our work to meet the challenge posed by quantifying 
the role of race and adjust policy accordingly.  To some, that may sound like 
a radical intervention.  In reality, it is what justice, in light of history, requires.  
Those who accept the reality of racism and develop algorithmic tools 
could be explicit about the racial dimensions of the inputs.  Rather than 
engaging in the Sisyphean task of attempting to scrub the data of racism, tool 
designers could attempt to measure the ways racism shapes the data and then 
account for it in the algorithms they build and the instruments they create.  
 
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple 
truth that race does matter.   
Id. at 381. 
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The criminal legal system constantly generates data that could be 
considered as part of such an effort.  For example, if a particular precinct 
engages in discriminatory policing, the disparities that result from those 
discriminatory practices would be accounted for in the data set, the algorithm, 
and the outputs.277  Data from that precinct could be included but discounted 
by a quantifiable factor because of the racially disparate impact of policing, 
or weighted by what one might expect to see in the absence of discriminatory 
policing.  Arrest data produced by officers could be quantitatively evaluated 
and adjusted to reflect policing patterns and behaviors that are otherwise 
problematic.278  Predictions that flow from tools that rely on such data might 
be accompanied by an explicit disclaimer that the data relied upon is tainted 
by a history of racially discriminatory policing practices.279  
Racial disparities in areas such as housing, education, health, wealth, 
employment, and criminal legal system contact are not unknowable or 
unknown; they are simply ignored or elided.  And yet they are fully baked 
into the outputs of tools which rely on such data points.  If we know that to 
be the case, it is incumbent on us to take stock of that fact.  Quantifying how 
these disparities shape the lives and the experiences of communities, and then 
discounting the data points by that numerical value is another way of 
surfacing and accounting for race.280  One might attempt to quantify a world 
that we seek, where all races were treated equally by the criminal legal 
system, and choose to use that data as part of the analysis.281 
Leveling the algorithmic playing field is undoubtedly a complex and 
challenging undertaking.282  Racial inequality can shape institutions and 
individual lives in ways that can be impossible to quantify.  Since race is a 
construct, and the dimensions of racism transform over time as the political, 
legal, and social context change, it may not be possible to design a specific 
 
 277. Richardson et al., supra note 71, at 24–26.  
 278. Id. at 17–20 
 279. Id. 
 280. Such an accounting is reminiscent of a racial attrition index, which Professor Derrick Bell 
imagined would be “prepared by social scientists and computer-oriented statisticians [to] provide a 
dramatic rendering of our social progress and decline.”  CARVING OUT A HUMANITY 155 (Janet 
Dewart Bell & Vincent M. Southerland eds., 2020). 
 281. Some researchers have attempted to account for racial inequality—and the benefit that 
white people receive because of their race—by proposing that an algorithmic tool be trained on 
white people alone as the more privileged group.  Richard Berk & Ayya A. Elzarka, Almost 
Politically Acceptable Criminal Justice Risk Assessment, 1, 10 (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/teaching/ScienceDataEthics/AlmostPC.pdf.  Such a solution 
is by no means adequate, or even necessarily advisable, but serves as an example of the type of work 
that could be undertaken to address the racial inequality embedded in data.  
 282. See Mayson, supra note 24, at 2265–67 (examining the potential in allowing an “algorithm 
to assess . . . risk factors contingent on race” and describing the possible trade-off in predictive 
ability of the tool). 
 
538 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:487 
 
measure to capture its effects.283  It may be that we can never account for all 
the ways bias, inequity, and racism shape people’s lives.284  But that 
challenge cannot be dispositive.  
The criminal legal system often deals in nuance: the appropriate 
quantum of punishment, the justifications necessary to vindicate law 
enforcement intrusion, the decision to proceed to trial or plead guilty, and the 
credibility of a witness at trial as weighed against biases—explicit and 
implicit—that shape their testimony.  Rather than turn away from the 
complexity, by design the legal system regularly imposes a requirement that 
decisionmakers confront and consider it, even if that consideration is less 
than ideal.  A ready example is the instruction given to jurors when evaluating 
the credibility of a witness against the biases that may shape the witness’s 
testimony.285  While racism may be a permanent force, its permanence does 
not prevent us from taking stock of its effects, shaping and remaking the tools 
that guide decisions with close to full knowledge regarding its effects. 
2. Accounting for Race in the Outputs 
The challenges of quantifying the impact of racial inequality with 
precision also do not prevent us from having a different set of responses to 
the data, or the tools that analyze it.  If our aim ultimately is to eliminate 
 
 283. Carbado, supra note 263, at 1611.  Race has no biological significance; it only contains the 
meaning that we give it.  Id. at 24. “The anthropologist Ashley Montagu was among the first to 
argue that race is a human invention, a social construct, not a biological one . . . .”  ISABEL 
WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 24 (2020).  The law differentiates 
between races and determines the racial categories into which we sort individuals and assigns 
meanings to those categories—both good and bad—in service of a hierarchy that serves the interests 
of those in power—the status quo.  Id.  
 284. To be clear, there is no singular experience or set of unifying characteristics tied to identity.  
Capers, supra note 263, at 25–26; Devon Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30: 
Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 2193, 2205 (2019).  Although the focus here is on race, an ideal approach is one that 
accounts for multiple, complex grounds of identity that drive oppression, marginalization, and 
treatment.  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67 (1989). 
 285. For example, New York jurors are instructed as follows: 
As judges of the facts, you alone determine the truthfulness and accuracy of the testimony 
of each witness.  You must decide whether a witness told the truth and was accurate, or 
instead, testified falsely or was mistaken.  You must also decide what importance to give 
to the testimony you accept as truthful and accurate.” 
N.Y STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, Credibility of a Witness, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY 1, 2 (2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-
General/CJI2d.Credibility.pdf.  While the instructions go on to state that “[t]here is no particular 
formula for evaluating the truthfulness and accuracy of another person’s statements or testimony[,]” 
jurors are told to consider, among other things, whether the witness harbored “a bias, hostility or 
some other attitude that affected the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.”  Id. 
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unwarranted, race-driven disparate treatment in the administration of 
criminal law, we can readily implement policy responses that help us to 
achieve that goal.  What I am suggesting is a complete repurposing of 
algorithmic tools for ends that boldly attack the manifestations of racial 
inequality at a structural and institutional level.  In this way, the tools could 
function like a “mirror;” our response is an adjustment of what is reflected 
back to us.286 
That may mean responding to the targets of predictive policing with 
investments of resources, rather than the deployment of law enforcement, in 
the places where those tools forecast crime will take place.  It could require 
that the people we view as potential victims or perpetrators of crimes are 
treated through a public health lens, rather than a criminal legal system lens, 
such that we provide those people with an array of services, supports, and 
investments to ensure that forecasts about them do not come to pass.  We 
may choose to send social workers, doctors, and mental health professionals 
to respond to forecasts of potential future criminal activity rather than 
police.287  Or we may decide to make a different set of investments in those 
communities expressly focused on supporting institutions that help steer 
people away from the criminal legal system, such as education, employment, 
housing, and health.288  
In the arena of pretrial decision-making, it could be that we calibrate 
decisions to suggest release for the overwhelming majority of those charged 
with crimes such that no disparity exists, even if the accuracy of forecasts 
produced by the tool suffers.289  We could weigh the outputs used to guide 
sentencing decisions with data that reflects the nature of racial disparities in 
 
 286. See Mayson, supra note 24, at 2251 (describing the enterprise of prediction through 
algorithmic tools as a mirror).  
 287. See, e.g., Christie Thompson, This City Stopped Sending Police to Every 911 Call, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 24, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2020/07/24/crisisresponders; Rowan Moore Gerety, An Alternative to Police that Police Can Get 
Behind, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2020/12/cahoots-program-may-reduce-likelihood-of-police-violence/617477/; Andy 
Corbley, Instead of Responding with Cops, Denver Sends Health Care Teams to Non-Criminal Calls 
– And it’s Already Saving Lives, GOOD NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2021), 
https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/denver-looks-at-nonviolent-mental-health-policing-with-their-
star-social-worker-unit/. 
 288. See, e.g., Jacyln Cosgrove, L.A. County Voters Approve Measure J, Providing New Funding 
for Social Services, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-
03/2020-la-election-tracking-measure-j (60% of Los Angeles voters voted in favor of Measure J, 
which “requires that 10% of locally generated, unrestricted county money—estimated between $360 
million and $900 million—be spent on a variety of social services, including housing, mental health 
treatment and investments in communities disproportionally harmed by racism”). 
 289. See Yang, supra note 124 (explaining that English common law presumed release for those 
accused of noncapital crimes).  
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sentencing for particular crimes, communities, and individuals, along with 
data that accounts for the challenges that individuals face when attempting to 
reintegrate into society by finding stable employment, housing, healthcare, 
and other services. 
While it could invite a constitutional challenge,290 we may choose to be 
race conscious in our responses to the data and tools as we seek to eliminate 
the racial disparities in the forecasts they produce.  Imagine our response to 
tools that tell us people of color need to be policed more heavily, are more 
likely to fail to appear in court, or are more likely to recidivate than their 
white counterparts.  We could decide to reduce or eliminate police presence 
in communities of color, set lower thresholds for pretrial release (or higher 
bars for pretrial detention), or act in less punitive ways toward all people at 
sentencing to advance equity.  In this way, our response to what the data and 
the tools are telling us would differ dramatically.  System actors employing 
a race conscious lens could forgo our typical, harsh and punitive responses—
too often fueled by race-based inequity in service of a status quo that has 
always been unfavorable to people of color.   
D. Additional Paths Forward 
The next Section grapples with three potential policy prescriptions to 
address the problems presented by algorithmic tools using a racial justice 
lens.  First, such a lens suggests putting the onus on algorithmic tool vendors 
and system actors to root out and remedy discriminatory impacts imposed by 
algorithmic tools.  Second, it means placing algorithmic tools in the hands of 
communities to hold accountable those actors who engage in discriminatory 
or otherwise harmful conduct.  Finally, it requires rejecting the type of 
profiling that actuarial tools encourage.  In its place, a racial justice lens 
suggests adopting an individualized notion of justice that truly accounts for 
the complexity and story of the person standing before the court, rather than 
the characteristics that person shared with others. 
These solutions seek to shift power to those who are currently powerless 
given their relationship to the criminal system, while imposing the burdens 
of antiracism where they belong: on institutional actors and tool vendors.  
They also raise questions that suggest a broader vision of justice.  The hope 
is that such a dynamic may encourage the type of wholesale transformation 
the criminal legal system desperately needs, driven by abolition.  
 
 290. See infra notes 397–399 and accompanying text. 
  
2021] THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND ALGORITHMIC TOOLS 541 
 
1. Shift the Burden   
One of the more promising features of algorithmic tools is their ability 
to surface shortcomings in the law that require a shift in our current legal 
regime.  One such shortcoming is the challenge the law presents in remedying 
the racially discriminatory harms that individuals may suffer when 
algorithmic tools are at play.  Generally, the onus is on the victim of racial 
discrimination to use the law in order to identify and remedy their own 
harm.291  Unfortunately, the law is not always up to the task.  Indeed, the 
law’s failure actually perpetuates the status quo, necessitating a radical 
intervention to produce progressive change.292  Placing the burden to root out 
and remedy algorithmic racial discrimination on tool vendors and the 
institutions that seek to use them, rather than on those who are assessed by 
the tools, may be one way to address the law’s failure.  A review of the 
constitutional barriers to accountability faced by potential victims of 
algorithmic discrimination underscores the value of this potential solution.  
The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause is the most significant 
avenue available to challenge the racial discrimination in the administration 
of criminal justice by state actors.293  Yet the limits placed on the Equal 
Protection Clause to redress systemic discrimination in the criminal system 
have stifled reform and perpetuated inequity for over three decades, since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp.294  McCleskey applied the 
purposeful discrimination standard first articulated in Washington v. Davis295 
and affirmed in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
 
 291. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring that a 
complainant charging racial employment discrimination under Title VII prove a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination. Under this regime, a plaintiff must prove that her race was a “but-for” cause 
of her adverse treatment). 
 292. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 85 (2006) (finding that in racial harassment claims, Black and Asian American 
plaintiffs have the lowest percentage of wins – at 19.3% and 18.9%, respectively – compared to 
white plaintiffs, who have a 35% success rate). 
 293. The focus of this section is on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as a 
means to address discriminatory harms because it is the principal means to do so in the criminal 
legal system absent state antidiscrimination law.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
(“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the 
Equal Protection Clause. . . .”).  Litigants have also unsuccessfully pursued challenges made 
pursuant to the due process clause.  State  v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied sub 
nom., Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017). 
 294. 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Annika Neklason, The ‘Death Penalty’s Dred Scott’ Lives On, 
ATLANTIC (June 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/legacy-
mccleskey-v-kemp/591424/.  
 295. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
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Development Corporation.296  In doing so, the Court ruled that a successful 
Equal Protection challenge must demonstrate that government officials 
exercised their discretion with a “discriminatory purpose,” amounting to 
intentional, purposeful discrimination.297  In the absence of such a 
determination, an Equal Protection claim must fail.298  The Court explained 
that it “would demand exceptionally clear proof before [it] would infer that 
the discretion has been abused.”299  While the dissent decried the majority’s 
decision as the manifestation of “a fear of too much justice,” the intentional 
discrimination standard has remained the law since 1987.300  
Equal Protection doctrine is “woeful[ly] inadequa[te]” to address the 
“forms and dynamics of algorithmic criminal justice tools.”301  First, as a 
technical matter, it is incredibly difficult to surface intentional discrimination 
in the context of the tools themselves.302  “There is no such thing as code that 
bespeaks racial animus.”303  Evidence of discriminatory intent, difficult to 
amass when algorithmic tools are not at play, is even more difficult to 
uncover when trying to assess why particular features of data were selected 
to train an algorithm.304  This concern is just one of a number raised by the 
search of purposeful discrimination in algorithmic tools.305  
Practical problems of proof also assume that there is explicit malicious 
intent to be found.  It may not be, given that those who design tools and 
implement them do so with the express intention of addressing the bias that 
 
 296. 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977).  While an expansive discussion of the development of Equal 
Protection jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article, a brief review is useful.  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence shifted in the late 1970s, from examining allegations of purposeful 
discrimination in context to searching for malice.  The Court turned away from a concern with 
purposeful discrimination through the lens of “contextual intent,” which “focused on motives [of 
alleged discriminatory actors] only in the loosest sense (and sometimes not at all).”  Ian Haney-
López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2012).  Abandoning context, in 
subsequent years, the Court turned to a search for “malicious intent” which “declares direct proof 
of injurious motives a prerequisite and, more pertinently, renders contextual evidence irrelevant.”  
Id.  
 297. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 297. 
 300. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 301. Huq, supra note 11, at 1083. 
 302. Id. at 1102. 
 303. Id. at 1066. 
 304. Id. at 1098.  
 305. Others include sorting out and assigning malice to the motives for the design and 
implementation of an algorithmic tool, looking at the challenges posed by examining the wide range 
of actors in the system that contribute to the data that informs the tools and “aggregating a large 
number of dispersed individual motives so as to ascertain whether a but-for standard of 
intentionality has been met by a collectivity,” and considering whether reliance on flawed data 
would amount to intentional discrimination.  Id. at 1088–94.  
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so often pervades the criminal legal system, even when those tools encourage 
decisions that may reflect the biased data that they are fed.306  Unlike the 
police officer who explicitly engages in racial profiling, or the prosecutor 
who exercises discriminatory peremptory challenges, or the judge who, with 
purposeful animus, levies harsh punishments on people of color, the motives 
of those in the algorithmic tool business are publicly stated as racially 
benevolent.307  That benevolence, in the context of a legal framework 
designed to respond to explicit and malicious acts of racial discrimination, is 
a shield from the interrogation that proof of an Equal Protection violation 
requires.308  
In many ways, the concern that the searching scrutiny of our Equal 
Protection framework fails to account for the way actuarial tools operate 
parallels concerns first raised by Professor Charles Lawrence in his seminal 
work highlighting the gap between “unconscious bias” and the purposeful 
discrimination standard imposed by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.309  The advent of algorithmic tools and the 
regulation that accompanies their use provides a new opportunity to upset old 
standards that have proven unresponsive to the realities of discrimination.310  
 
 306. See Risk Assessments, When Paired with Appropriate Policies, Can Contribute 
Significantly to Pretrial Reform, ARNOLD VENTURES (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.arnoldventures.org/newsroom/risk-assessments-when-paired-with-appropriate-
policies-can-contribute-significantly-to-pretrial-reform/ (“We are strongly committed to reducing 
racial bias in pretrial decision making.  In particular, we seek to understand how risk assessment 
can be used to reduce racially disparate outcomes.”).  
 307. Id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 115 (describing a predictive policing company’s efforts 
to account for racial bias in policing). 
 308. Huq, supra note 11, at 1088 (“The concerns of constitutional law simply do not map onto 
the ways in which race impinges on algorithmic criminal justice.  The result is a gap between legal 
criteria and their objects.  Crucially, the two main doctrinal touchstones of bad intent and bad 
classifications provide scant traction for the analysis of algorithmic criminal justice.  Both hinge on 
concepts that translate poorly, if at all, to the algorithmic context and are not easily adapted for 
application to that end.  A focus on racial animus will almost never be fruitful.  A focus on 
classification leads to perverse and unjustified results.  The replacement of unstructured discretion 
with algorithmic precision, therefore, thoroughly destabilizes how equal protection doctrine works 
on the ground.  The resulting mismatches compel my conclusion that a new framework is needed 
for thinking about the pertinent racial equity questions.”). 
 309. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318–26 (1987). 
 310. Even efforts to hold accountable those who use actuarial tools with a knowledge of their 
disparate impact are foreclosed by the law, because “‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more 
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.  It implies that the 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979)) . 
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Given this opportunity to change the standard, policymakers must act.  
They must craft new regulatory schemes that can vindicate the potential 
harms imposed by algorithmic tools and fill the gaps of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  At a minimum, such legislation should impose an ex ante check on 
algorithmic tools to alleviate harmful disparate impacts and to ensure that 
there is continued monitoring of the potentially harmful burdens imposed by 
use of the tools.311  Such a framework has the potential to alleviate the 
challenges of proof that litigants face in demonstrating that the harmful 
effects of a tool go beyond an individual to others who are similarly situated.  
A cursory survey of legislative activity and advocacy efforts attempting 
to curb the discriminatory harms imposed by actuarial justice provides some 
encouragement.  New York has enacted a requirement that pretrial risk 
assessments be “designed and implemented in a way that ensures the results 
are free from discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or any 
other protected class.”312  Notably, while this provision has not yet been 
applied or interpreted by any New York courts, it contains no explicit intent 
requirement.  It also imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure 
that the tools they use are free from discrimination.313  Similar legislation was 
under consideration in Washington and enacted into law in Idaho.314  At the 
federal level, three members of Congress introduced the Algorithmic 
Accountability Act of 2019, which would essentially require technology 
vendors to test the algorithms they use for bias.315  Once again, this legislation 
 
 311. Scholars have offered ways to measure the impact of algorithmic tools on racial equity.  
Huq, supra note 11, at 1128 (“[A]n appropriate benchmark would home in upon the net cost (or 
benefit) of an algorithmic criminal justice instrument for the racial minority in the socially 
subordinate position.”).  My concern is not so much with the metric of fairness being used, though 
that is deeply important, but requiring those who seek to design and implement the tools to 
demonstrate that they do not exacerbate racial inequality.  Choice of a fairness metric is a policy 
determination, rather than a technical one, that would need to be made in the policymaking process.  
See Mayson, supra note 24 at 2238–47 (detailing a host of applicable equality metrics); see id. at 
2294–95 (describing a combination of equality metrics that tools might meet); see also THE 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK 
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (2018), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf (recommending 
the use of varied measures of racial equity). 
 312. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.45(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 2020). 
 313. Id. § 510.45(3)(b)(i). 
 314. DJ Pangburn, Washington Could Be the First State to Rein in Automated Decision-Making, 
FAST CO. (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90302465/washington-introduces-
landmark-algorithmic-accountability-laws; Beryl Lipton, Idaho Legislators Approve Law 
Requiring Transparency for Risk Assessment Tools, MUCKROCK (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2019/mar/26/algorithms-idaho-bill-update/. 
 315. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019).  There are, in 
fact, efforts underway to audit algorithmic tools in a range of domains, though the parameters of the 
audit, the undefined nature of the field, the ways in which private companies choose to deploy the 
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imposes an affirmative obligation on those who seek to design and implement 
tools.  
Policy advocates have also advanced frameworks to shift the burden of 
rooting out harm from individuals to stakeholders.  Algorithmic Impact 
Assessments (“AIA”) are one such example of this burden shifting 
framework.  Modeled on environmental impact assessments, AIAs work by 
requiring government agencies to “assess how . . . systems are used, whether 
they are producing disparate impacts, and how to hold them accountable.”316  
They require government agencies to conduct a self-assessment of existing 
and proposed algorithmic tools to evaluate their potential impacts, engage 
external researchers to conduct ongoing auditing, publicly disclose audit 
results prior to procurement of an algorithmic tool, solicit public comments 
regarding the tool, and provide mechanisms for communities or individuals 
to challenge systems that produce harms.317  The framework is meant to 
enhance public accountability of algorithmic tools, “[i]ncrease public 
agencies’ internal expertise and capacity to evaluate the systems they build 
or procure” for disparate impacts, and empower the public with knowledge 
about tools in use and opportunities to determine the contours of 
accountability.318 
Assessments of impact prior to adoption and implementation are already 
required in some jurisdictions with regard to criminal justice policy.  Racial 
impact statements, for example, allow lawmakers to evaluate the racial 
disparities that legislation may produce before it is adopted and 
implemented.319  In 2008, Iowa became the first state to adopt such a measure, 
 
audit, and the relatively small number of firms that offer auditing capabilities provide some sense 
of the challenges posed by those efforts.  Alfred Ng, Can Auditing Eliminate Bias from Algorithms?, 
MARKUP (Feb. 23, 2021), https://themarkup.org/ask-the-markup/2021/02/23/can-auditing-
eliminate-bias-from-algorithms. 
 316. Dillon Reisman et. al., Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for Public 
Agency Accountability, AINOW 1, 4 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. at 5. 
 319. Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements, SENT’G PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements/.  In the algorithmic 
context these efforts could take on the character of race audits, described by Professor Robin 
Lenhardt as evaluative mechanisms that can be used “by localities interested in grappling with the 
inequalities that attend the color line.”  R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1534 
(2011).  Such audits do not search for “the proverbial wrongdoer,” but instead surface how racial 
inequality reveals itself in systems, procedures, practices, and relationships of a municipality across 
multiple life domains.  Id.  Subjecting algorithmic tools to a similar audit, sensitive to racial 
inequality, would theoretically expose how an algorithmic tool might perpetuate inequality.  See 
also, Deborah N. Archer, “White Men’s Roads Through Black Men’s Homes”: Advancing Racial 
Equity Through Highway Reconstruction, 73 Van. L. Rev. 1259, 1321 (2020) (recommending the 
use of racial equity impact studies by “policymakers embarking on highway development and 
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with four other states doing so since then.320  The Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission produces racial impact statements, though is not 
required to do so by law.321  New Jersey became the latest state to do so in 
2018, passing a law that “requires the state’s Office of Legislative Services 
to prepare racial-impact statements for policy changes that affect pretrial 
detention, sentencing and parole.”322  Such measures allow jurisdictions to 
uncover the causes of racial disparities and to understand how policy changes 
can exacerbate or reduce them.323 
Other accountability and oversight measures may rely more heavily on 
vendors and private industry.  Ethical codes of conduct that impose moral 
commitments on those who produce technology are another means of 
oversight, though they may place too much reliance on  the malleable moral 
compass of corporate actors, rendering such measures unreliable.324  
Requiring an algorithm’s proponent to provide a human impact statement, 
which could outline the expected ramifications of an algorithmic tool on a 
population, is one other accountability mechanism.325  
In practice, such measures might require algorithmic tool designers to 
disclose the datasets they relied upon to develop their tools, the efforts they 
undertook to assess those datasets for biases, and the measures taken to 
ensure that the forecasts produced by the tools do not unjustifiably vary by 
race.326  Such requirements are perfectly reasonable and well understood in 
 
redevelopment projects should engage in a systematic, comprehensive, and holistic review of how 
racial and ethnic groups will be impacted by the project”) 
 320. Porter, supra note 319. 
 321. Id.  
 322. Id.  
 323. Barkow, supra note 10, at 1610–13.  
 324. Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
54, 108 (2019) (“The issue of algorithmic accountability demonstrates one core aspect that is 
missing among computer scientists and software engineers: a concrete, user-friendly, ethical 
platform with which to approach decisionmaking and software design.”). 
 325. See id. at 115–18 (describing the proposed elements of a human impact statement); see also 
Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated 
Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 658–61 (2014) (recommending a “collective 
confrontation right to transparency and accountability standards in forensic analysis” that would 
place the onus on proponents of forensic evidence to offer evidence of structural and systemic 
features and quality control measures that ensure the accuracy of such evidence). 
 326. This work would require grappling with, and potentially using, different measures of 
fairness to evaluate unwarranted disparities produced by an algorithmic tool.  See supra notes 244–
256 and accompanying text for a discussion of two measures of fairness.  It would also require 
vendors to examine the data used, the algorithm, and the outputs for racial disparities.  One can 
imagine a range of efforts that vendors may have to undertake to account for unwarranted racial 
disparities, including consulting additional data sources, disregarding data sources, weighting 
forecasts produced by their tools, or providing an explicit disclaimer about the reliability of the 
output forecast because racial inequality is baked into the data relied upon.  Forcing proponents of 
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administrative law.327  Fundamentally, these frameworks force those who 
seek to develop and wield algorithmic tools to ask the difficult questions 
about the racialized harms they may produce upfront and actually address 
those harms when they surface.  They must also accommodate the critiques 
leveled at tools by impacted communities.  In their absence, those at the 
greatest risk of suffering a racially disparate impact are left to the inadequate 
tools provided by the law, ensuring that bias will persist, largely unchecked. 
2. Flip the Gaze 
Acknowledgment of racism’s permanence helps to shape the contours 
of another response to the concerns driven by actuarial and algorithmic 
decision-making: turning the tools away from the individuals subjected to the 
system and toward the institutional actors who run it.  The idea behind this 
recommendation is simple, and in part stems from the notion that 
interrogating the role of race and racism in inequality is essential.  If 
institutional actors and reform advocates really want to address unwarranted 
disparities in the administration of justice, we must be willing to subject those 
whose decisions shape the system to the same data-driven, evidence-based 
scrutiny that we foist on the people being shuffled through it.  What is good 
for the goose is good for the gander. 
This inversion of the target carries with it several potential benefits.  
Institutional actors—in particular, those who are making judgments about 
individuals—use algorithmic tools in the hopes that it will allow them to 
properly sort and classify individuals and make better decisions about them.  
Why not apply that same logic to the decisionmakers themselves?  
Understanding their behavior requires that we track the decisions they make 
when faced with a certain set of facts, particular pieces of information, or 
specific types of people.  That understanding can foster accountability 
through transparency by exposing the points where emotion, unreasonable 
risk aversion, or flawed judgments override facts and evidence to the 
detriment of those being judged.328 
 
algorithmic tools to explain themselves carries with it the potential benefits of improving the quality 
of outcomes and “deter[ring] bias and arbitrariness.”  Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and 
Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1868 (2019). There are a host 
of decision points that could be interrogated and disclosed for these purposes.  See id. at 1872–73 
(describing “aspects of the development of machine-learning-based decision tools, and of the 
decision rules embedded in those tools, that are . . . explainable”).  
 327. Strandburg, supra note 326, at 1882–84 (crafting a framework to promote transparency of 
machine learning tools by interpreting and applying administrative law practices to require an 
explanation of a tool and preservation of information about the source of the training data, its 
selection, and the methods used to validate the tool).  
 328. See Sarah Brayne, PREDICT AND SURVEIL: DATA, DISCRETION, AND THE FUTURE OF 
POLICING 101–06 (2020) (explaining how data can be used to reduce inequality in the criminal legal 
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It might also engender some empathy on the part of those institutional 
actors who reflexively assert that subjecting people who are entangled with 
the criminal legal system to actuarial decision-making is the best path 
forward.329  Experience can be sobering.  No one really likes to be held to 
account, monitored, or have their decisions called into question.330  First, 
there is the general uneasiness that comes with being surveilled, tracked, and 
having one’s privacy upended.331  Compounding that is the fear that one’s 
hard-earned, experience-driven, professional judgment is devalued by the 
introduction of algorithmic tools.332  Changing the targets might lead to more 
creative thinking about the efficacy of algorithmic tools and the value of their 
forecasts. 
Finally, it allows us to use data to shape the discretion exercised by 
system actors.  Commendable behavior can be encouraged by providing 
support and guidance as needed where discriminatory or otherwise harmful 
decision-making has surfaced.  Those supports could include changes to 
policy or practice, training on bias and decision-making, or a narrowing of 
the choices available to avoid poor decision-making.  These remedial efforts 
need not be punitive if there is broad-based commitment to cleansing the 
criminal legal system of as much injustice and unfairness as possible.333  
Although a simple agreement about the need for change may not be enough 
to overcome the natural resistance put forward by system actors, that 
 
system by “aggregating data on police practices [to] shed light on systematic patterns and 
institutional practices previously dismissed as individual-level bias, ultimately providing an 
opportunity to police the police. . . .”).  
 329. While one would hope decision makers subjected to algorithmic tools would empathize 
with those who face such tools in the criminal legal system, there is no guarantee that they would.  
See id. at 98 (detailing the cognitive dissonance of police officers who did not recognize the parallels 
between their discomfort with managerial surveillance and the surveillance technologies they 
imposed on others). 
 330. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 4, 9; see Brayne, supra note 328 at 75–99 (describing 
law enforcement reaction to, and resistance against, managerial surveillance). 
 331. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at  9; see also Harry Bruinius, Why Police Are Pushing 
Back on Body Cameras, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0830/Why-police-are-pushing-back-on-body-
cameras. 
 332. Brayne & Christin, supra note 169, at 9. 
 333. This attitude is reflected in civil and human rights lawyer Bryan Stevenson’s reminder that 
part of the challenge of addressing racial inequality is that American society is obsessed with 
punishment.  That obsession has led people to feel that by surfacing the ways that racial inequality 
has infected the world around us, punishment must result.  As Stevenson reminds us,  
I’m not interested in prioritizing punishment.  I want to liberate us.  I want to get to the 
point where we can say, “‘That was bad and that was wrong and we need to get to 
someplace that’s better!”‘  I want to deal with this smog created by our history of racial 
inequality, so we can all breath something healthy, feel something healthy.   
THOMPSON ET. AL., supra note 268, 88. 
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resistance should not upend efforts to impose transparency and 
accountability.  
Two conditions of flipping the gaze of algorithmic tools are essential.  
First, the effort to close the racial equity gap by using algorithmic tools must 
be informed by a harm reduction framework, rather than the type of 
ratcheting up that results when the answer to inequity is to treat everyone 
more harshly.  For example, if a tool reveals that a judge imposes more 
lenient sentences on white people than Black people, resolving that disparity 
would require treating all people with the same type of leniency that white 
people receive, rather than sentencing more white people to lengthier terms 
of incarceration.  Ultimately, imposing such a condition helps to avoid the 
same dynamic that often taints criminal policymaking to “reward 
punitiveness and punish mercy.”334  
Second, the tools must be placed in the hands of communities 
empowered to hold institutions and actors accountable.  “Community” is 
defined here as the network of individuals who are advocating for equity in 
the criminal legal system and are bound together by their common concerns 
about the inequities fostered by the use of algorithmic tools and the criminal 
legal system.  Failing to provide community control has the potential to 
wholly undermine the value of flipping the gaze.335  
The experience of body-worn cameras as accountability mechanisms for 
police conduct provides a ready example of what happens when the hands 
 
 334. Maurice Chammah, Could Removing Brock Turner’s Judge Hurt Poor and Minority 
Defendants?,  MARSHALL PROJECT (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/16/could-removing-brock-turner-s-judge-hurt-poor-
and-minority-defendants (describing how the removal of a judge following public backlash against 
judge’s perceived leniency in sentencing a white youth in a sexual assault case may discourage 
leniency and lead to more severe sentences for clients of color convicted of similar offense); see 
also Barkow, supra note 3, at 105–23 (describing how the public, elected officials, and interest 
groups advance tough on crime policies that favor lengthy sentences).  
 335. Community education is another critical component of community oversight of system 
actors via technology.  It is essential that communities understand the relationship between 
technology, the data upon which it relies, and the ways that systems and institutions function.  A 
prominent example of this educational work is being done by the Our Data Bodies Project, which 
describes itself as “a five-person team concerned about the ways our communities’ digital 
information is collected, stored, and shared by government and corporations.”  Who We Are, OUR 
DATA BODIES: HUM. RTS. AND DATA JUS., https://www.odbproject.org/about/who-we-are/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2020).  Given that concern, the Project focuses on the intersection of data collection 
and human rights, and provides guidance on data protection, supports community education and 
organizing, and demonstrates how data impacts domains such as housing, urban development, 
public benefits, and reentry.  Id.  In a somewhat similar vein, the Detroit Digital Justice Coalition 
hosts workshops called DiscoTechs, short for Discovery Technology.  About, DETROIT DIGIT.  JUST. 
COAL., http://detroitdjc.org/about/story/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).  These workshops “are a space 
to learn about the impact and possibilities of technology within our communities,” and serve to 
“demystify, engage, and inform the community about issues of Internet use and ownership, and our 
communications rights on and offline.”  Id. 
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that wield the tools are unchanged.336  Body-worn cameras were widely 
adopted to curtail police violence against communities of color.337  Isolated 
incidents of success meant that they quickly were adopted as part of the 
standard suite of remedial mechanisms in systemic efforts to reform 
policing.338  Lawsuits and consent decrees demanded their use.339  Police 
departments nationwide, spurred on by the promise of additional federal 
funding, acquired them.340  
Yet for all of the accountability promised, the institutional actors 
holding the tools of accountability have not changed, which means the tools 
have not been able to meet their potential.341  We have not seen a wholesale 
 
 336. Amanda Ripley & Timothy Williams, Body Cameras Have Little Impact on Police 
Behavior, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/police-
body-camera-study.html; German Lopez, The Failure of Police Body Cameras, VOX (July 21, 
2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/21/15983842/police-body-cameras-
failures. 
 337. Lindsey Van Ness, Body Cameras May Not Be the Easy Answer Everyone Was Looking 
For, PEW (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/01/14/body-cameras-may-not-be-the-easy-answer-everyone-was-
looking-for (describing the widespread adoption of body-worn cameras following the 2014 killing 
of Michael Brown at the hands of a police officer); Ben Miller, Data Pinpoints the Moment When 
Police Body Cameras Took Off, GOV’T TECH. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/data/Data-
Pinpoints-the-Moment-When-Police-Body-Cameras-Took-Off.html. 
 338. A 2016 Bureau of Justice Statistics survey concluded that nearly half of U.S. law 
enforcement agencies had acquired body-worn cameras.  Shelley S. Hyland, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/bwclea16.pdf; Cynthia Lum et. al., Research on Body-Worn 
Cameras: What We Know, What We Need to Know, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 93, 94 (2019), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1745-9133.12412 (“Body-worn cameras . . . are 
one of the most rapidly diffusing technologies in policing today. . . .”).  
 339. New York’s experience with body-worn cameras is one example.  Ashley Southall, New 
York’s First Police Body Cameras Take to Streets in Upper Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/nyregion/new-york-police-department-body-cameras.html 
(explaining that introduction of body-worn cameras was part of the remedies set forth in litigation 
regarding the unconstitutional policing tactics of the New York City Police Department); Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Because body-worn cameras are 
uniquely suited to addressing the constitutional harms at issue in this case, I am ordering the NYPD 
to institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras will be worn for a one-year period by officers 
on patrol in one precinct per borough—specifically the precinct with the highest number of stops 
during 2012.”). 
 340. See supra notes 337–339. 
 341. Body Worn Camera Basics, BALT. POLICE DEP’T (last visited  May 7, 2021), 
https://www.baltimorepolice.org/transparency/body-worn-cameras (announcing that of 133,000 
videos recorded in first six months of implementation of body worn cameras across the Baltimore 
Police Department, fourty-seven were flagged for review of potential misconduct); Megan Hickey, 
How Often Do Chicago Police officers Fail to Activate Their Body Cameras? It’s Hard to Know, 
CBS 2 CHI. (July 30, 2019) https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/07/30/inspector-general-chicago-
police-body-cameras/ (reporting that an investigation by the City of Chicago Office of the Inspector 
General found that lieutenants failed to review body camera footage or discipline officers who did 
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change in the culture of policing or definitive evidence that the cameras 
reduce police use of force.342  That can be explained by who holds the tools 
and power to ensure accountability.343  It is often the police who decide when 
to operate the cameras and what gets recorded.344  Before an incident reaches 
a prosecutor’s desk, a myriad of hurdles may stand in the way of 
accountability.  As a policy matter, the cameras, the data, and the footage 
they produce are securely in the possession of law enforcement until law 
enforcement decides to make it public.345  And police, along with other 
system actors, may have an outsized say over whether conduct caught on 
camera will warrant a corrective intervention.  Prosecutors rarely prosecute 
police.346  That fact does not change when prosecutors do get body camera 
footage, which is far more often used to prosecute civilians.347  Thus, rather 
than providing a community with an accountability measure, the cameras 
have served as another point of grievance by the community seeking 
accountability.348  
 
not comply with the body worn camera policy, thereby violating the federal consent decree that 
mandated and funded the department’s body worn camera policy). 
 342. Lum et al., supra note 338, at 109 
 343. See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 465–
66 (2018) (describing the cameras as “technology that remains in the hands of the police and at the 
mercy of the prosecutor [and] remains embedded in a criminal system bureaucracy that has more 
interest in protecting itself than in accountability for its violence against Black people”).   
 344. See Police Body Camera Policies: Recording Circumstances, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1 
(Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/police-body-camera-
policies-recording-circumstances  
 345. Chad Marlow & Gary Daniels, Ohio Bucks a Bad Trend With New Police Body Camera 
Law, ACLU (Feb. 5, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/ohio-bucks-bad-trend-new-police-body-camera-law/.  
 346. Id.  But see Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Officer Who Turned Off Body Camera Charged 
With Tampering With Evidence; Others Cleared, BALT. SUN (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-body-camera-tampering-20180124-
story.html. 
 347. One study found that 93% of prosecutors who responded that their jurisdiction uses body 
worn cameras use the footage from those cameras primarily to prosecute citizens rather than police. 
Lum et al., supra note 338 at 108.  
 348. For thirteen months, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel blocked the release of dashboard 
camera footage showing Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke killing Laquan McDonald, a Black 
seventeen-year-old.  While Van Dyke claimed that McDonald lunged at him with a knife, the video 
shows Van Dyke shooting McDonald sixteen times as McDonald walked away from him.  The 
delay in releasing the video coincided with Emmanuel’s reelection campaign.  Jessica Glenza, 
Chicago Officials Delayed Release of Laquan McDonald Shooting Video, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/01/chicago-officials-delayed-release-laquan-
mcdonald-shooting-video; Bernard E. Harcourt, A Cover-Up in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 
2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/opinion/cover-up-in-chicago.html. Van Dyke was 
eventually charged with murder, convicted, and sentenced to nearly seven years in prison.  Mitch 
Smith & Julie Bosman, Jason Van Dyke Sentenced to Nearly 7 Years for Murdering Laquan 
McDonald, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/us/jason-van-dyke-
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That is why community control and power are so important.  When the 
gaze of technology is flipped on system actors and the tools are placed in 
community hands, it can be used to interrogate and evaluate the system in 
ways that are innovative and beneficial.349  For example, Campaign Zero—
an organization dedicated to reducing police violence nationwide350—began 
using big data to evaluate California’s 100 largest municipal police 
departments based on the number of arrests made for low-level offenses, the 
use of force during an arrest, the rate of homicides solved, the presence or 
absence of racial disparities in arrests and use of force, and the treatment of 
civilian complaints of police abuse.351  That information can be used to 
advocate for changes to police policies and practices.  
Chicago’s Citizens Police Data Project also provides a measure of 
accountability through data by “tak[ing] records of police interactions with 
the public—records that would otherwise be buried in internal databases—
and opens them up to make the data useful to the public, creating a permanent 
record for every . . . police officer.”352  CAPstat,  a police accountability 
database modeled on the Chicago tool, has been developed and is in use in 
New York.353  Relying on publicly available data collected from various 
sources between 2011 and 2018, the database demonstrates: 
[T]ransparency can improve our collective ability to identify trends 
of misconduct across, for example, different types of allegations, 
 
sentencing.html.  While Chicago officials have moved more quickly since 2015 to release body 
camera and dashboard camera footage, the process of releasing such footage varies state by state, 
department by department.  Richard Fausset & Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, As Body Cameras 
Become Common, a Debate Over When to Release the Footage, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2021) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/02/us/police-body-cameras-andrew-brown-north-carolina.html.  
For example, although protesters have demanded the release of body camera footage depicting the 
police killing of Andrew Brown Jr., a judge has delayed its release for at least 30 days.  Richard 
Fausset & Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, Judge Declines Immediate Release of Video in North 
Carolina Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2021) 
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/04/28/us/andrew-brown-jr-shooting-body-camera. 
 349. See Mayson, supra note 24, at 2284–86 (recommending the use of algorithmic tools as 
diagnostic measures to identify sites of racial disparity for correction). 
 350. See Vision, CAMPAIGN ZERO (last visited March 1, 2021), 
https://www.joincampaignzero.org/#vision. 
 351. Police Scorecard, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://policescorecard.org/findings (last visited Jan. 
15, 2020). 
 352. Citizens Police Data Project, INVISIBLE INST., http://invisible.institute/police-data (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2020).  Critically, it was this data set that revealed multiple allegations of misconduct 
against Chicago Police Officer Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke. Sarah Kaplan, Chicago 
Police Officer Charged in Deadly Shooting Has a History of Misconduct Complaints, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/25/chicago-
cop-charged-in-deadly-shooting-has-a-history-of-misconduct-complaints/;  see also supra note 348 
and accompanying sources.  
 353. What is this Data?, CAPSTAT, https://www.capstat.nyc/about/what/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
2020). 
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commands and units that could inform policy debates, improve 
public discourse about police misconduct allegations and be a 
resource for people who witnessed or were harmed by police 
misconduct to help them decide what to do next.354 
Though these tools specifically targeted police behavior, one can readily 
imagine a similar tool focused on the conduct of judges, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, probation officials, and parole officials.  The Vera Institute for 
Justice demonstrated this concept through a project aimed at addressing 
prosecutorial discretion in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina.355  That work involved collecting data to monitor the exercise 
of discretion by prosecutors at various decision points in the criminal legal 
system.356  Researchers then analyzed that data to determine the source of 
racial disparities for particular charging decisions associated with drug 
crimes.357  Once researchers identified the sources of disparity by examining 
the data and engaging in a qualitative analysis of decision-making,358 
prosecutors in Milwaukee discovered that junior, less experienced 
prosecutors pursued drug paraphernalia cases more aggressively than their 
colleagues.359  Mecklenburg County prosecutors found that drug 
paraphernalia cases constituted 97% of all drug cases, and “press[ing] 
[charges] for all drug cases and every drug charge” involving Black women, 
despite the fact that many of those cases were ultimately dismissed or 
resolved with a diversion into drug treatment.360  These offices made policy 
changes to address their findings, resulting in a narrowing of racial disparities 
for a subset of the crimes prosecuted by both offices.361  
Another example can be found in a recent analysis of just over 105,000 
criminal cases handled by the Legal Aid Society of New York and the bail 
decisions made by judges in those cases.362  Although the data collected did 
 
 354. Id. 
 355. Wayne McKenzie et al., VERA INST. OF JUST.,  PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING 




 356. Id. at 5.  
 357. Id. at 6–7. 
 358. Id. 
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 362. Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You’ve Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay It? It 
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not allow for any demographic analysis, what the effort uncovered was that 
bail amounts set on people accused of crimes varied dramatically based on 
where a person was arraigned, the crime they were charged with and the 
judge presiding over the arraignment.363  Getting arrested on the “wrong day” 
could mean that a person is “more than twice as likely to have to” post bail 
to purchase their freedom.364  
These examples demonstrate how collecting data about the past 
behavior of system actors can help inform how they might behave going 
forward in ways that align with racial equity.  All that is required is a 
willingness to subject system actors to scrutiny.365  That is no easy feat; but 
if accomplished, greater scrutiny would shift the nature of the inquiry 
undertaken by algorithmic tools in the criminal legal system. 
3. Listen to the People Being Judged.  
One feature of algorithmic decision-making is that it emphasizes 
quantitative data for predictive purposes over the narratives that shape the 
lives of the individuals to be judged by the state.366  That emphasis is 
troubling because it is done in service of what amounts to profiling— though 
it is often characterized as prediction.  Rather than give in to that dynamic, it 
is necessary to adopt an orientation that views stories and anecdotes as data 
points that carry just as much—if not more—power than raw numbers and 
leave predictive analytics behind.367  The march toward algorithmic tools 
 
 363. Id.  
 364. Id.  
 365. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 1726–28 (recommending that people employ technology to 
“identify and excavate the sites where inequality has been institutionally embedded”). 
 366. See supra Section I.D.3.  
 367. In discussing the power of stories to “destabilize hardened and assumed norms” one scholar 
pointed to examples of stories told by Black women enmeshed in the criminal legal system, 
explaining that:  
personal narratives reveal types of information and knowledge that are neither manifested 
in the doctrinal representations of their stories nor necessarily reflected in the statistics 
that present the quantitative picture of black women within the criminal justice system.  
If nothing else, both the statistics pertaining to the conviction and incarceration rates of 
African-American women discussed below and stories . . . remind us that there is a real 
cost to being marked by difference within society. Telling our versions of our stories is 
merely a first step in revealing the reach of institutional power and the systemic nature 
of oppression.  
Mario L. Barnes, Black Women’s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of Narrative, 
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 954, 957 (2006).  Indeed, stories open up the world in ways that can 
alter human judgment:   
Stories humanize us.  They emphasize our differences in ways that can ultimately bring 
us closer together.  They allow us to see how the world looks from behind someone else’s 
spectacles.  They challenge us to wipe off our own lenses and ask, “Could I have been 
overlooking something all along?”  Telling stories invests text with feeling, gives voice 
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needs to be balanced by an accounting of the context that produces the 
quantitative data.  
A racial justice lens suggests an approach that privileges the voices and 
narratives of those closest to the harms perpetuated by the system.368  That 
does not mean dispensing with numbers altogether.  Statistics serve real and 
important purposes.  They can inform decision-making, shape policy, and 
highlight patterns of harm.  They can help decisionmakers take stock of the 
barriers that stand in the way of the accused in a more rigorous way.  They 
can also foster transparency around the decision-making process and provide 
an avenue for accountability.  Indeed, the entire premise of flipping the gaze 
of tools on the actors in the system is rooted in the idea that statistics bear 
value and can influence the exercise of discretion.  
These benefits carry a danger.  Privileging quantitative data over 
qualitative information can blind decisionmakers from doing the work to 
uncover the unique forces, facts, and circumstances that lead people into the 
criminal legal system.  Pure reliance on statistical metrics stifles the curiosity 
and creativity that system actors may need to fully engage the complexities 
of peoples’ lives in meaningful, productive and effective, ways.  For 
example, the number of individuals who fail to appear in court following their 
initial release from custody is a specific data point.  That information can 
shape systemic responses to failures to appear.  But without context and 
nuance—answering the question of why it is that people fail to appear in 
court—those responses will be inadequate.  Stories—the qualitative 
information—give meaning to the numbers. 
There is another important benefit to stories.  One of the many things 
that I learned during my time defending people who were accused or 
 
to those who were taught to hide their emotions.  Hearing stories invites hearers to 
participate, challenging their assumptions, jarring their complacency, lifting their spirits, 
lowering their defenses.  Stories are useful tools for the underdog because they invite the 
listener to suspend judgment, listen for the story’s point, and test it against his or her own 
version of reality.   
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2411, 2440 (1989).  Accordingly, “[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful 
means for destroying mindset — the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared 
understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.”  Id. at 
2413. 
 368. “[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we 
should listen.  Looking to the bottom—adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the 
falsity of the liberal promise—can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the 
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.”  Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987).  That 
is because those who have been harmed by the oppressive, interlocking systems of racial power 
have unique experiences and insights to offer that generate novel solutions to racial inequality.  Id. 
at 325. 
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convicted of crimes is that context matters.  I came to learn that when judges 
or other actors in the criminal legal system took stock of that context, more 
often than not it worked to the benefit of my clients.  Although there were 
certain predictable and identifiable barriers to success—comparisons to 
similarly situated individuals were generally informative—one’s life 
circumstances added a layer of nuance that group-level data too often 
obscured.  That is because group-level data is about generalizations rather 
than specifics.369  Turning from the general to the specific when deciding a 
person’s fate requires a heavier emphasis on the stories that comprise a 
person’s life.370 
As with the other potential solutions, this one has its own challenges.  
Of course, decisionmakers may already take stock of context in a range of 
ways.  That consideration can be based on their personal preferences, biases, 
or past experiences.  But the potential differences in the weights assigned to 
context and stories by decisionmakers is not unlike what already takes place 
in the criminal legal system.  As long as actors have discretion, they will 
always be tasked with striking a balance among—and attributing weight to—
the information presented to them.  That is an unavoidable consequence of 
being empowered to make decisions about someone else’s life.  
The answer is to ensure that stories are a part of the decision-making 
calculus—while qualitative data is used to expose and correct the biased 
exercise of discretion—rather than in service of making a prediction about 
someone.371  Compelling stories about a client’s life can shape the outcome 
of a sentencing proceeding in dramatic ways.  Stories can drive judges away 
from rote sentencing practices and force them to engage facts that “center 
and humanize” the person to be sentenced and “disrupt judicial inclinations, 
be they implicit or overt, to base sentences on conclusions derived from 
bias.”372  Proper consideration of client stories may allow us to move toward 
a larger ideal: a system of individualized justice, tailored to the circumstances 
of one’s life and weighed against the allegations they face, or the crimes for 
which they have been convicted.  
 
 369. Aaron J. Fisher et al., Lack of Group-to-Individual Generalizability is a Threat to Human 
Subjects Research, 115 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S E6106, E6113 (2018). 
 370. One judge’s description of sentencing in the context of algorithmic tools is clarifying: 
“When done correctly, the sentencing process is more art than science.  Sentencing requires the 
application of soft skills and intuitive insights that are not easily defined or even described.  
Sentencing judges are informed by experience and the adversarial process.”  Noel L. Hillman, The 
Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58 JUDGES’ J. 36, 37 (2019). 
 371. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 1727 (suggesting an end to the type of predictive analytics 
that expand the carceral state).  
 372. Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 125, 142–43 (2018). 
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Getting to individualized justice begins with acknowledging that our 
current system singles out the disfavored among us for control, oppression 
and punishment, because those on the receiving end are perceived as 
deserving it.373  That ideology is cloaked in a historical narrative that refuses 
to believe that pain even exists at all for people of color and makes it that 
much easier to punish indefinitely.374  Combating this mindset requires 
“tell[ing] a different story,” one that allows decisionmakers to “resist the 
narratives that render” people of color and other marginalized groups “as 
superhuman to the point of being impervious to pain, and insist[ing] that their 
pain is our collective responsibility to help heal.”375  Shifting the narrative in 
that direction means acknowledging the present day impacts of past systems 
of oppression in to arrive at a set of solutions that stretch beyond those 
ordinarily deployed by the criminal legal system.376  Context matters not 
because it excuses the harms that someone causes, but because it 
“acknowledges and transforms the realities that made that harm likely.”377  
The current Canadian model of sentencing provides a useful, albeit 
cautionary, guide.378  A series of reforms to the Canadian sentencing regime 
were enacted in 1996.379  The first Canadian Supreme Court decision that 
spoke to those reforms, R. v. Gladue,380 deemed the reforms “remedial in 
nature” and aimed at “ameliorat[ing] the serious problem of 
overrepresentation of [A]boriginal people in prisons, and . . . encourag[ing] 
sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to 
sentencing.”381  The commitment to act and repair the harms of the past was 
 
 373. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND THE 
ROAD TO REPAIR 192–95 (2019). 
 374. Id. at 194–95. 
 375. Id. at 222. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 224.  The type of attention given to context in restorative justice may provide some 
guidance.  As a practice, it requires “acknowledging responsibility for one’s actions, acknowledging 
the impact of one’s actions on others, expressing genuine remorse, taking actions to repair the harm 
to the degree possible, and no longer committing similar harm. . . .”  Id. at 236–37. 
 378. There are, of course, notable differences between the structure and character of the 
Canadian criminal legal system as it pertains to sentencing, chief among them is the incorporation 
of restorative justice principles in sentencing people of native descent.  Toni Williams, Punishing 
Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal Women in Canada, 
55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 269, 276–78 (2007); see also Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, 
Weathering the Storm? Testing Long-Standing Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First 
Century, 45 CRIME & JUST. 359, 364–66 (2016) (describing Canadian sentencing practice).  
 379. See Williams, supra note 378 at 273–78 (describing sentencing reforms enacted in Canada). 
 380. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (Can.) 
 381. Id. para. 93.  Notably, the parallels between racial disparity in the sentencing of Black 
people and white people in the United States and Aboriginal people and whites in Canada are 
striking.  The Gladue Court took stock of the sentencing disparities in Canada at the time reforms 
were enacted, pointing out that “[n]ative people come into contact with Canada’s correctional 
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the impetus for the change in the law.  According to the Court, “[t]he drastic 
overrepresentation of [A]boriginal peoples within both the Canadian prison 
population and the criminal justice system” was expressly recognized as “a 
sad and pressing social problem” requiring redress in the eyes of the 
Canadian Parliament.382  
Gladue traced the sources of sentencing disparity to causes such as 
“poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of employment 
opportunities for [A]boriginal people . . . . bias against [A]boriginal people 
and from an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to refuse 
bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for [A]boriginal 
offenders.”383  The law placed the onus on sentencing judges to remedy 
“injustice against [A]boriginal peoples” by requiring judges to “pay 
particular attention to the circumstances of [A]boriginal offenders, with the 
implication that those circumstances are significantly different from those of 
non-[A]boriginal offenders.”384  Those circumstances include:  
The unique systemic or background factors which may have played 
a part in bringing the particular [A]boriginal offender before the 
courts; and . . . .[t]he types of sentencing procedures and sanctions 
which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender 
because of his or her particular [A]boriginal heritage or 
connection.385   
Critically, judges must evaluate not only the direct discrimination 
encountered by native people, but the systemic and institutional structures 
that drive inequality and injustice.386  
 
system in numbers grossly disproportionate to their representation in the community . . . . almost 
10% of the federal penitentiary population is native (including 13% of the federal women’s prisoner 
population) compared to about 2% of the population nationally . . . .” Id. para. 60. At bottom, the 
Court explained, “[t]he Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada—First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, on-reserve and off-reserve, urban and rural—in all 
territorial and governmental jurisdictions.” Id. paras. 60–70. A 2009 statistical analysis reveals that  
Aboriginal persons have consistently comprised 17 to 19% of all adult admissions to 
Canadian federal penitentiaries for the past decade, even though Indigenous peoples 
represent only 3% of the Canadian population.  The statistics are even more shocking 
when it comes to admission to provincial jails. In 2007/2008, Indigenous persons 
comprised 21% of all admissions to provincial jail in Newfoundland and British 
Columbia, 35% in Alberta, 69% in Manitoba, 76% in the Yukon, 81% in Saskatchewan, 
and 86% in the Northwest Territories.  
David Milward & Debra Parkes, Gladue: Beyond Myth and Towards Implementation in Manitoba, 
35 MANITOBA L.J. 84, 84–85 (2011). 
 382. Gladue, 1 S.C.R. para. 64. 
 383. Id. para. 65. 
 384. Id. paras. 65–66. 
 385. Id. para. 66. 
 386. Id. paras. 67–69. 
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The law also directs judges to consider the prevalence of restorative 
justice in the indigenous community, leading to a regime that requires judges 
to weigh restorative justice principles in the analysis of an appropriate 
sentence.387  In practice, judges may take “judicial notice of the broad 
systemic and background factors affecting [A]boriginal people, and of the 
priority given in [A]boriginal cultures to a restorative approach to 
sentencing.”388  Case-specific details are to come from counsel and a 
presentence report.389 
The fact that this regime may yield disparate sentences for Aboriginal 
people compared to their non-Aboriginal counterparts for the same offense 
is an accepted function of an individualized system of justice.  Such a result 
is to be expected when a judge undertakes a holistic consideration of the 
person being sentenced, the person harmed, the affected community, and the 
available sanctions.390 
Of course, the gap between theory and practice is often the space where 
disappointment resides, and the implementation of Canada’s sentencing 
reforms and adherence to Gladue is one such space.  The system has not 
dramatically reduced the disparities in sentencing suffered by Aboriginal 
people compared to their white counterparts in Canada.391  Yet the failings of 
Gladue and the statutory regime it interpreted can be readily explained.  
Those explanations can guide the implementation of similar reforms 
elsewhere. 
First, there are natural limits to a sentencing judge’s ability to account 
for and remedy the discrimination and structural barriers to equality that drive 
people into the criminal legal system.392  It is also the case that Gladue and 
the law have been applied in an irregular and uncertain fashion across all 
 
 387. Id. paras. 70–71.  Gladue described restorative justice:  
as an approach to remedying crime in which it is understood that all things are interrelated 
and that crime disrupts the harmony which existed prior to its occurrence, or at least 
which it is felt should exist.  The appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely 
determined by the needs of the victims, and the community, as well as the offender.  The 
focus is on the human beings closely affected by the crime.   
Id. para. 71. 
 388. Id. para. 7.  
 389. Id.  
 390. Id. paras. 86–88. 
 391. See Graeme Hamilton, Twenty Years after Federal Government Changed Sentencing, 
Aboriginals Still Disproportionately Fill Our Prisons, NAT’L POST (last updated Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/sentence-enough-twenty-years-after-gladue-aboriginals-
still-disproportionately-fill-canadian-prisons (describing persistent overrepresentation of 
indigenous people in Canada’s prisons, despite Gladue, and noting failure to provide alternatives to 
incarceration or resources to fully implement sentencing reforms). 
 392. R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 474–75, para. 69 (Can.). 
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offenses—most notably those deemed “serious.”393  Everything from the 
preparation of presentence reports that incorporate the inquiry made by 
Gladue to misgivings about the value of Gladue in particular cases have 
limited its effectiveness.394  And requiring system actors to be more attentive 
to context does not, by itself, eliminate the biases they may already harbor in 
carrying out that mandate. 
Notwithstanding the real challenges of implementation, the Gladue 
framework represents a purposeful shift in the information that a sentencing 
judge is required to focus on and the weight those factors are to be given.  
Such a shift, if adopted in the United States against the backdrop of 
algorithmic tools395 and history of racial inequality, may change our 
understanding of what justice requires, while avoiding the pitfalls of profiling 
that can flow from algorithmic tools.  One can conceive of a criminal legal 
system that invokes the use of narratives “to shed light on the conditions of 
an unjust, racialized institution and to humanize the people placed within 
it.”396  Numbers can only tell a part of that story. 
4. Challenges: Legal and Otherwise.  
Many of the recommendations advanced in Part II require a more robust 
endorsement of race-conscious remedies than the Equal Protection Clause 
currently allows.  The Equal Protection Clause prohibits remedies that 
“contain[ ] an explicit racial classification [and] laws that assign rights or 
burdens based on racial classifications”397 unless they are narrowly tailored 
to meet a compelling government interest.  The types of remedial efforts 
advanced in Part II, especially those that rest on explicit consideration of race, 
have run into difficult legal challenges in the past in other contexts398 and 
 
 393. Id. para. 86. 
 394. Milward & Parkes, supra note 344, at 86, 94, 96.  
 395. It is worth noting that algorithmic tools such as risk assessment instruments are widely used 
in Canada to inform sentencing decisions and issues related to treatment and supervision.  Offender 
Risk Assessment Practices Vary Across Canada, PUB. SAFETY CAN., 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2017-s015/index-en.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 
2020); Simon Fraser University, Risk Assessment Tools Lead to Fewer Incarcerations Without 
Jeopardizing Public Safety, SCIENCEDAILY (Oct. 28, 2019), 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/10/191028164344.htm (“Tools are used in nearly every 
Canadian province and U.S. state, and at least 40 other countries.”). 
 396. Webb, supra note 372 at 151.  Indeed, such narratives were invoked on the road to the 
abolition of slavery, as a means to expose the brutality of the system and educate people about the 
humanity and dignity of people who were enslaved.  Id. 
 397. Huq, supra note 11, at 1083. 
 398. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-271 (1978); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 316-17 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2205-07 
(2016); see also Haney-López, supra note 296, at 1781–84 (describing how remedial efforts are 
viewed by the Supreme Court through the lens of “colorblindness” which “consistently imposes the 
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might here as well.399  Such challenges are to be expected.400  The types of 
obstacles that always accompany the implementation of reforms—from 
institutional resistance to logistics—warrant attention.401 
The public appetite for the types of remedial measures and policy 
recommendations described in Part II also needs to grow.  They seek to shift 
power, redress longstanding harms, and cure significant structural inequities.  
America has long approached efforts to remedy structural racism as a zero-
sum game; where one race or cohort of people may be made whole, the work 
required to bridge the gap between equity and the status quo necessarily 
means that another group or race (or several races) must lose out.402  That 
zero-sum mentality is complemented by simple racial fear—fear that a status 
quo which has served the interests of those in power will be upended to their 
disadvantage.403  The zero-sum, fear-based worldview has bedeviled 
remedial measures of all sorts for decades, including efforts to integrate 
schools, housing and the workforce.  The same is true in the criminal legal 
system. 404  
 
most stringent form of scrutiny,” ensuring that plaintiffs challenging such remedies “virtually 
always win”). 
 399. There is at least debate about whether differential treatment along racial lines would be 
barred by Equal Protection jurisprudence.  Huq, supra note 11, at 1133; cf. Deborah Hellman, 
Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 819, 864 (2020) (positing that anti-
discrimination law does not pose insurmountable barriers to race conscious remedial efforts aimed 
at improving the fairness and accuracy of algorithmic tools).  
 400. The law naturally preserves the status quo.  Thus, it “typically works to disadvantage 
outsiders such as people of color, women, sexual minorities, and the poor.”  Capers, supra note 263, 
at 24–25. 
 401. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE SENATE BILL S7506B, 303–12 (2020) 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/S7506 (expanding the number of crimes eligible 
for cash bail, three months after the enactment of bail reform); Nick Pinto, America’s Crisis Daddy 
Andrew Cuomo Exploits Coronavirus Panic to Push Bail Reform Rollback in New York, INTERCEPT 
(Mar. 25, 2020) https://theintercept.com/2020/03/25/coronavirus-andrew-cuomo-new-york-bail-
reform/ (describing the successful effort to roll back some bail reforms by police, prosecutors, and 
politicians).  But see Christopher Robbins, New York State Legislature Votes to Repeal Law 50-A 
that Shields Police from Scrutiny, GOTHAMIST (June 9, 2020) https://gothamist.com/news/new-
york-state-legislature-votes-repeal-law-50-shields-police-scrunity (reporting the repeal of 50-A, a 
law that shielded police misconduct records from the public, which passed despite opposition from 
police unions state-wide). 
 402. See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game 
That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCH. SCI. 215, 216–17 (2011) (finding that not “only do 
[w]hites think more progress has been made toward equality than do Blacks, but [w]hites also now 
believe that this progress is linked to a new inequality—at their expense”). 
 403. Charles M. Blow, White Extinction Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/opinion/america-white-extinction.html.  
 404. Simply put, our criminal legal system is replete with “ill considered policies because we 
have a pathological political process that caters to the public’s fears and emotions without any 
institutional safeguards or checks for rationality.”  BARKOW, supra note 4, at 12.  
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Those challenges cannot be dispositive.  Resistance to change is natural.  
Indeed, our racial history has moved through a “reform/retrenchment 
dialectic.”405  Reforms yield racial progress, only to eventually engender 
resistance that turns into retrenchment and regress.406  That is why bold 
interventions are necessary to upend the status quo.407  The embedded nature 
of racism and the status quo preservationist limits of classical liberal reforms 
means that wholesale change—rather than piecemeal fixes—must be 
employed.408  Changes to the law can be driven by cultural shifts, as popular 
will can shape and reshape legal doctrine.409  Swaying public sentiment to 
align the law with the types of remedial measures advanced here would be 
necessary.  Unprecedented national and international mass movements in 
response to racial injustice and racial hostility410 have provided some hope 
about what is possible.411   
One of Professor Derrick Bell’s widely known theories may inform the 
strategy undertaken to harness the will to foster change: interest convergence.  
This principle provides that “[t]he interests of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites.”412  In other words, progressive reform has a chance to take hold if 
the reforms sought are in the interests of the dominant class—those with the 
power needed to implement them. 413   
Proponents of algorithmic tools—including criminal legal system actors 
who are aligned with the dominant class—should have an interest in tools 
that work as advertised to produce a functioning and just criminal legal 
 
 405. Carbado, supra note 263, at 1607–08. 
 406. Id.  
 407. “[T]rue change is possible only through radical interventions.”  Capers, supra note 241, at 
27. 
 408. Wing, supra note 263, at 52.  We must also be prepared to face the fact that even 
comprehensive changes may not ultimately do the trick.  Id. 
 409. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 381–84 
(2009) (describing how politics and judicial interpretation have shaped Constitutional meaning.).  
 410. Eduardo Porter, After the Election, a Nation Tinged with Racial Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/business/after-the-election-a-nation-tinged-with-
racial-hostility.html’. 
 411. Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-
protests-crowd-size.html.  
 412. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
 413. Wing, supra note 263, at 48; Carbado, supra note 263, at 1608; Capers, supra note 263 at 
25.  
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system free from racial inequality.414  Those who experience the racialized 
harms and burdens imposed by the criminal legal system likewise have an 
interest in alleviating those harms.  Each of the policy prescriptions in Part II 
lend themselves to interest convergence because, if implemented, they can 
best satisfy the reform-oriented concerns of criminal legal system actors and 
those who have experienced the system as the accused. 
Of course, getting people to see how their interests may intersect is not 
easy.  Even a cursory examination of America’s political history reveals how 
hard it is for people to understand how systems of racial oppression can 
produce harms that are at odds with the fervent sense of superiority that 
racism foments.415  Despite these challenges, at the very least, interest 
convergence sheds some light on how we might overcome the practical 
hurdles raised by imposing a racial justice lens on the operation of criminal 
legal system algorithms. 
III. ALGORITHMIC TOOLS AND PRAGMATIC ABOLITION 
The responses to actuarial risk assessment I have catalogued are largely 
aimed at shifting the balance of power from actors in the criminal legal 
system to those who are usually subjected to the harmful treatment by that 
system.  Algorithmic tools may not be able to deliver on the hope that they 
can reduce racial bias in decision-making.  They may not imbue the criminal 
system with fairness or justice.  But their design and use can require a critical 
inquiry of the way our system operates.  And that inquiry produces an 
opportunity to fundamentally transform our current approach to criminal 
justice.416 
I have suggested four interventions: (1) forcing actors to account for the 
ways in which racism has infected every institution that governs us;417 (2) 
 
 414. In New York, for example, District Attorneys in Manhattan, Queens, Bronx, and Brooklyn 
have shown support for certain parole reform legislation, citing the current law’s disproportionate 
impact on people of color and imploring that “the exorbitant money we are wasting on their 
reincarceration should be reinvested into programs that make us safer.”  Darcel Clark et al., On 
Parole Violations, Less is More: Three DAs Urge Reform to Stop Sending People Back to Prison, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Mar. 20, 2020) https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-parole-less-is-
more-20200312-bsujoxccpjdh5pocvdgh2d3wny-story.html.  
 415. Sean Illing, How the Politics of Racial Resentment Is Killing White People, VOX (Mar. 19, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/19/18236247/dying-of-whiteness-trump-politics-jonathan-
metzl; Damon Young, This Is What White Supremacy Looks Like, NATION (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/this-is-what-white-supremacy-looks-like/. 
 416. A fundamental transformation refers most readily to the remaking of the American legal 
system within the frame of racial justice.  See Paul Butler, The System is Working the Way It Is 
Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. J. 1419, 1478 (2016) (describing 
the need to end the current criminal legal system and fundamentally remake it and America).  
 417. See supra Section II.A. 
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demanding that those who make and deploy algorithmic tools demonstrate 
that they will not produce racial harms for people of color;418 (3) holding 
actors accountable for their decisions by shifting the aim of the tools at those 
actors;419 and (4) infusing our system with attention to context, 
circumstances, and basic dignity.420  In doing so, the hope is that we can use 
these algorithmic tools in service of building a different criminal legal 
system.  In this way, the solutions I have outlined operate with a pragmatic 
abolitionist ethos.  
Talk of abolition is sometimes met with derision, because it implies the 
end of a system without thought given to what comes after the fall.421  When 
I advance a pragmatic abolitionist ethos, it does not mean that the criminal 
legal system as we know it ends immediately, or that abolitionists are not 
already pragmatic.  Practically speaking, a sudden disintegration of 
America’s criminal legal system is not possible.422  The system is too massive 
to fall all at once.  Instead, a pragmatic abolitionist ethos here means that we 
press for a wholesale transformation of the criminal legal system while 
maintaining an “openness to unfinished alternatives,”423 all while using the 
tools available to us to do so.  
That involves turning to approaches that contradict the premises of the 
old system, while ensuring those approaches are plausible enough to compete 
with the system currently in place.424  Reforms that produce a system that is 
radically out of step with the status quo will be met with resistance.  That is 
because they seem too far outside the realm of possibility—too unrealistic—
given our collective experience with the criminal legal system.  But reforms 
that help to build and shift power in basic ways might be both plausible and 
effective enough to help carve a path toward transforming the system.425  
 
 418. See supra Section II.B. 
 419. See supra Section II.C. 
 420. See supra Section II.D. 
 421. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 105 (2003) (noting that the question of 
what replaces jails and prisons following abolition “often interrupts further consideration of the 
prospects for abolition”).  The question misunderstands abolition, because “[a]bolitionists always 
have their eyes set on a future they are in the process of creating.”  Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: 
Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 120 (2019) (explaining why abolitionist thinking 
extends beyond the end of a regime or practice to focus on what comes next).  
 422. Indeed, “[p]rison abolition is a long-term project that requires strategically working toward 
the complete elimination of carceral punishment.  No abolitionist expects all prison walls to come 
tumbling down at once.”  Roberts, supra note 421, at 114.  
 423. Allegra McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished 
Alternatives, 8 HARV. UNBOUND 109, 109 (2013).  
 424. Id. at 120. 
 425. Akbar, supra note 343, at 460–69 (detailing an abolitionist ethos built on the need to end 
“punitive systems of social control” and drive the “reorganization of the state through the 
redistribution of power and resources”). 
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In the most hopeful view, reformers might use the tools alongside, and 
in service of, efforts to steadily dismantle the carceral state,426 with an eye 
toward ultimately replacing that state with something better suited to 
delivering justice.427  That something should be thought of as a “constellation 
of alternative strategies and institutions”428 rather than “one single alternative 
to the existing system of incarceration.”429  Doing so necessarily demands 
amassing power430 that drives changes to “unravel rather than widen the net 
of social control through criminalization.”431  It also means that 
transformation of the system takes place over time, intermittently, 
notwithstanding the frustration that will be felt by the deliberate pace of 
change.  
Such a vision is dramatically different than the one offered now in 
conversations at the intersection of technological tools and the criminal legal 
system.  At present, the turn to tools has—in the best case—been in service 
of a system that operates more efficiently but retains all of its fundamental 
characteristics.  Indeed, “the state uses artificial intelligence and predictive 
technologies to reproduce existing inequalities while creating new modes of 
carceral control and foreclosing imagination of a more democratic future.”432  
Yet if we know anything about the criminal legal system—following 
repeated study, anecdotal evidence, and a wealth of experience—it is not well 
 
 426. See supra Sections II.C.1 & II.C.2 (discussing potential ways to account for race in 
algorithmic tools to drive changes in criminal legal system policy). 
 427. “As movement voices suggest, the abolitionist project is not only negative, it is imaginative; 
solutions involve social organizations and the reallocation of resources, with investments in jobs, 
health care, and schools as alternative frameworks for existing investments in policing and 
incarceration.”  Akbar, supra note 343, at 471.  Professor Dorothy Roberts has charted such a course, 
by suggesting that abolitionists can invoke the U.S. Constitution to advance abolitionist goals.  
Roberts, supra note 421, at 105–20.  Specifically, Professor Roberts recommends “using the 
Constitution to build a society based on principles of freedom, equal humanity, and democracy–a 
society that has no need for prisons.”  Id. at 110.  Such a project is multifaceted. It includes holding 
courts and legislatures to a faithful reading of the Constitution.  Id. at 110–13.  It also means 
adopting “nonreformist reforms” that “make transformative changes in carceral systems with the 
objective of demolishing those systems rather than fixing them.”  Id. at 114.  It means mitigating 
the harms that carceral punishment imposes.  Id. at 118.  And it means using the Constitution to 
demand the investments required for a society to function without prisons.  Id. at 119–20. 
 428. DAVIS, supra note 421 at 107. 
 429. Id. at 108. 
 430. Power here is best defined as “not a thing but rather a capacity composed of active and 
changing relationships enabling a person, group, or institution to compel others to do things they 
would not do on their own.”  Rather than attempting to wrest power away from institutions, we 
should aim to “make power” through movement building—the result of developing capacities and 
putting them to work toward transformative ends.  RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: 
PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 247–48 (2007) 
(emphasis omitted).  
 431. Id. at 242. 
 432. Roberts, supra note 421 at 29.  
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suited to deliver the justice for which people clamor.  It falls short in 
providing accountability to those harmed by crime, rehabilitation to those 
who have run afoul of the law, and fairness to all.  It traffics in race and 
inequality.  It is the culminating site of all of our social ills.  It must be 
dismantled.433  
Implementing the types of solutions I have outlined would mean altering 
the way the system operates while acknowledging and confronting the world 
as it is.  It would mean forcing stakeholders to pay attention to context rather 
than a forecast, at a societal and individual level, when making decisions 
about the course of a person’s life.  It would also mean grappling with the 
ways that decisions made by criminal legal system actors may be riddled with 
or reflective of the bias that infects the world around us.  This framework 
represents a reasonable shift away from much of what we currently accept 
about the criminal legal system—that what someone has done or been 
accused of renders context irrelevant, that actors cannot be held to account 
for biased decision-making, and that bias is inevitable and therefore cannot 
be addressed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether or not algorithmic tools will catalyze the types of changes 
needed to fundamentally alter the way the criminal legal system operates 
remains to be seen.  As communities, scholars, activists, and stakeholders 
have pointed out, these tools reflect back to us the world that we live in.  If 
we are honest about it, what we see in that reflection is a criminal legal system 
riddled with racism and injustice.  A racial justice lens helps us to understand 
that and demands that we adjust our responses to what we see to create the 
type of world that we want to inhabit.  We can undertake that work, or 
continue along our present course and reify the biases and unfairness that 
already characterize our criminal legal system, but the ultimate choice is ours 
to make.  If we choose wisely, we will use the tools—problems and all—to 
help us engage in wholesale transformation of the system. 
 
 433. “In other words, the way to stop big data’s threat to society is not to improve big data.  It is 
to work toward changing the unjust structures that big data supports.”  Roberts, supra note 27, at 
1725.  
